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134 I  N T R 0  D U C T I  0  N 
The  Special  Committee  of  Inquiry,  which  was  set  up  by  the 
Commission  at  its 266th  meeting  on  3  October  1973  and  had  its terms 
of  reference  extended on  5 March  1975,  has  as  its principal  task  the 
analysis  of  known  cases  of  fraud,  the  study  of  Community  rules  and 
their  application by  national  authorities  in  order to detect  the  loop-
holes  which  could  lead  to fraud  or  irregularity or to the  misuse  of 
public  funds,  and  the  proposing  of effective measures  to eliminate 
where  possible  any  opportunities  for  fraud  in  the  future.  The  public 
funds  in  question  are  those  of  the  FEOGA  Guarantee  Section. 
After  submitting  four  reports  on  expenditure  by  the  FE0GA 
Guarantee  Section  (milk  and  milk  products,  oilseeds  and  olive oil, 
beef  and  veal,  and  wine),  the  Special  Committee  of  Inquiry  has now 
investigated the  cereals  sector  which  forms  the  subject  of this  re-
port.  Its  investigation  has  been  limited to the  cereals  sector  in 
the  strict  sense,  i.e.  rice  and  food  aid  were  not  looked  at. 
As  in  its previous  investigations,  the  Committee  made  use  of 
questionnaires  to gain  a  complete  picture of  the  rules  and  thus  to 
evaluate  the  practical  application thereof  and  pinpoint  the  areas 
where  loopholes  might  exist.  In  addition to the  information  about 
fraud  reported to the  Commission  by  the  Member  States under  Regu~­
tion  No.  283/72  and  forwarded  by  the  Commission  to  the  Committee, 
information  was  obtained  by  the  Committee  from  standard  question-
naires.  These  sources  provided  it  with  enough  material  for  a  thor-
ough  study  of  all the  problems  posed  by  the  rules  and  of  the  inad-
equacies  of  control  procedures. - 2  -
Visits  were  also  organized to  five  countries  :  France  on 
12-15  June  1978,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  on  18-21  Sep-
tember  1978,  Italy on  9-13  October  1978,  the  Netherlands  on  30 
November-1  December  1978  and  Denmark  on  12-13  March  1979. 
The  purpose  of  these  visits  was  to enable  the  members  of 
the  Committee  to  see  for  themselves  how  the  intervention  and  the 
cereals trading  system  function  in practice  and  to obtain  a  clearer 
picture of  the  economic  background  against  which  operations  in the 
cereals  sector  are  conducted. 
0 
0  0 
The  Special  Committee  of  Inquiry  wishes  to  take  the  opportun-
ity  provided  by  the  submission  of  this  report  to  recapitulate  the 
general  conclusions  and  recommendations  of  its earlier  reports. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Committee  has  advocated  improvement 
of  Community  rules  to  achieve  greater  clarity  and  to  modify  certain 
arrangements  which  are  particularly difficult to  implement.  It  has 
stressed  the  importance  of  greater  cooperation  between  the  administra-
tive authorities  within  each  Member  State,  between  the  various  Membtr 
States,  and  between  the  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  together 
with  the  need  for  and  improvement  in  control  procedures.  It  has  sug-
gested  bridging  certain gaps  in  the  control  system  and  introducing 
more  effective  ways  of  recovering  aid  improperly  paid.  Finally  it  has 
stressed  the  importance  of  better training  for  the  staff  in  charge  of 
controls. 
In  the  investigation  carried out  for  this  report,  the  Special 
Committee  of  Inquiry  considered  the  circumstances  of  all  the  irregu-- 3  -
larities brought  to  its notice  in  the  cereals  sector  and  the  weaknesses 
likely to  be  exploited  in  the  systems  of  administration  and  control. 
It  studied  the  possible  measures  that  the  Community  and  the  national 
authorities  could  take  in  order  to  make  good  the  inadequacies  in  the 
rules  and  safeguard  the  Community's  interests. 
The  Committee  begain  its task  by  analysing  the  economic  prob-
lems  of  the  sector  and  the  Community  measures  taken  to  solve  them. 
These  are  dealt  with  in  the  first  two  chapters. 
It  then  examined  one  of  the  main  sensetive  areas,  namely  in-
tervention  (Chapters  III to  VI).  Three  chapters  are  devoted  to the 
particular problems  of  transfers,  production  refunds  and  aid  to durum 
wheat. 
Another  sensitive  area  is  the  implementation of  rules  on  trade; 
the  Committee  studied  the  problems  of  Community  transit,  monetary  com-
pensatory  amounts  and  trade  with  non-member  countries.  These  ~tters 
are  dealt  with  in  Chapters  VII  and  VIII. 
Finally  the  Committee  has  devoted  one  chapter  (IX)  to  special 
problems  arising  in  connection  with  trade  in  processed products,  more 
particularly the difficulties  in  analysis  and  in  calculating the  over-
all  monetary  compensatory  amounts  on  the  basis  of  the  monetary  amounts 
on  the  constituent  basic  products. 
0 
0  0 - 4  -
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CHAPTER  I 
THE  CEREALS  SECTOR 
I.  ECONOMIC  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  SECTOR 
1 
2 
1  A)  World  production 
World  production of  cereals totals  1  060  million t, of  which 
wheat  accounts  for  380  million t. 
The  main  wheat  producers  are  the  United  States  (53  million t, 
the  USSR  (90  million t), Canada  (18  million t), Australia 
(11  million t)  and  the  Community  (40.5  million t>.  The  rest 
of  the  world  produces  168  million t. 
Feed  grains  (680  million t)  are  grown  mainly  in  the  United 
States  <183  million t), the  USSR  (98  million t), Canada 
(19.5  million t), Argentina  (15.5  million t)  and  the  Commun-
ity  (60.5  million t), the  rest  of  the  ~i!~Orld  producing  304 
mill  ion t. 
B)  Size  of  world  market 
Every  year  the  world  market  handles  about  66  million  t  of 
wheat  2,  of  which  3  million  t  is durum  wheat.  This  is more 
Average  1973  to  1977.  Source  FAO 
Average  1972  to  1976.  Source  FAO  and  OECD 1 
2 
- 6  -
than  the  Community's  total production.  World, trade  in  feed 
grain totals  68.5  million t  2  annually,  again  more  than 
total  Community  production.  This  includes  approximately  55 
million t  of  maize,  8  million  t  of  barley  and  2 to 3  million t 
of  sorghum. 
The  world  market  is not  therefore  of  marginal  importance  since 
it  accounts  for  17  X of  world  wheat  production  and  10%  of 
feed  grain  production. 
Three  countries,  the  United  States,  Canada  and  Australia,  al-
ways  have  a  surplus  for  all  cereals.  North  America  is domi-
nant,  particularly  in  feed  grain.  The  USSR,  although  a  very 
large  producer,  can  only  just  meet  its own  needs  and  the  Com-
munity  depends  on  the  world  market  for  17  % of  its feed  grain 
supplies  1 
C)  The  Community's  part  in  world  trade 
Of  the  63  million t  of  common  wheat  offered  on  the  world  mar-
ket  the  Community  purchases  5.6 million  t  2  and  sells 5.6 
million t  (including  flour  :  3.9 million  t  in  wheat  equival-
ent  It  also buys  1.1  million  t  of  durum  wheat,  i.e. more 
than  one  third of  the  amount  sold on  the  world  market.  Esti-
mates  for  marketing  year  1978/79  are  for  imports  of  4 million t 
of  common  wheat,  1 million  of  durum  wheat  and  over  5  million t 
in  exports  (including  flour). 
Of  the  68.5  million t  of  feed  grain  traded  annually  the  Commun-
ity  imports  17  million  t  2,  of  which  13  million t  is  maize, 
but  exports only  3 million t.  Of  the  13  million t  maize,  2.5 
million t  is for  processing  into starch. 
Net  import  balance  (imports  minus  exports)  as  percentage  of total 
consumption 
Averages  1972  to  1976.  Source  :  FAO  and  OECD - 7  -
The  Community  is  dominant  however  in  the  markets  in  processed 
cereal  products  (mainly  flour  and  malt),  its market  share 
ranging  up  to  60  %.  Although  these  markets  are  much  smaller 
(only  4.5  and  2 million t)  than  the  wheat  and  feed  grain mar-
kets,  they  are  more  stable.  The  added  value  is  considerable. 
D)  World  prices 
After  a  long  period of  stability world  prices  have  risen  con-
siderably  since  1972,  in  part  because  of  harvest  shortfalls 
in  the  USSR  and  a  reduction  in  areas  sown  in  the  United  States.1 
By  1974  world  prices  were  triple those  in  the  stable period, 
but  after  1976  they  reverted to  levels  approaching  those of 
1971;  they  then  stabilized before  showing  an  upward  trend  half 
way  through  1979. 
Until  1975  world  prices  were  very  sensitive to  fluctuations  in 
supply  and  demand  and  the  world  market  reacted to all develop-
ment  on  any  scale  anywhere  in the  world.  This  dependence  has 
been  reduced  since  then  by  the  United  States stabilization 
measures,  in particular  by  the  increase of  producers'  stocks, 
released  when  prices attain  a  certain threshold. 
Since  1971,  market  prices  fixed  in dollars  have  been  affected 
by  the  fluctuations  in  the  dollar's  value.  This  structural 
phenomenon  seriously  handicaps  trade  as  it creates  a  speculat-
ion  element  that  is external  to the  market  itself. 
1  10  X decrease  between  1967/68  and  1969  to  1972 - 8  -
The  world  market  thus  has  three  main  features  :  the  chronic 
deficit  in  many  countries,  the  very  strong position of  North 
America  as  the  only  area  with  regular  large  surpluses,  and 
the  price  variations  entailed  by  fluctuations  in  the  value 
of  the dollar. 
The  purpose  of  the  Community's  policy  is to'shield consumers 
and  producers  from  world  market  price  fluctuations  by  means 
of  a  bracket 
1  within  which  market  prices  are  left  free  to 
find their  own  levels. 
II.  SITUATION  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  (see  diagram  at  end  of  Chapter  and  at 
Appendix  I) 
A)  Area  sown 
The  area  under  cereals  has  been  stable  for  many  years  at  around 
26  million  hectares.  This  overall  stability  however  disguises 
different  trends  for  the  various  cereals.  The  areas  under  oats  and 
rye  have  been  halved  and  that  under  common  and  durum  wheat  has 
remained  relatively stable.  The  last  20  years  have  however  been 
marked  by  a  considerable  development  in  barley  and  maize  growing. 
Over  the  last  few  years  there  has  been  some  stabilization in 
the  areas  given  over  to  each  cereal. 
B)  Production 
Total  cereal  production  in  the  Community  of  Nine  (discounting 
the  year-to-year  variations  caused  by  variable  weather  conditions, 
1  I  .  .  I  t  '  ntervent1on  pr1ce  targe  pr1ce. - 9  -
in  particular  the  poor  1975  and  1976  harvests)  has  increased 
steadily over  the  past  20  years  from  around  70  million  t  to 
its present  level  of  around  110  million t, made  up  of  40 
million t  of  common  wheat  and  almost  the  same  amount  of barley, 
15  million  t  of  maize,  8  million t  of  oats  and  3  million t 
each  of  durum  wheat  and  rye.  This  growth  is due  to  an  in-
crease  in  average  yields,which  rose  from  26  quintals per  hec-
tare  in  1960  to  41  in  1978. 
Two  factors  are  responsible  for  this  increase  :  technical  , 
progress  (use  of  fertilizers,  crop  protection,  irrigation) 
and  the  replacement  of  some  spring  cereals  (barley  and,  to a 
lesser extent,  oats)  by  higher  yielding  but  poorer  quality 
winter  ones.  Yield  improvements  vary  however  for  the differ-
ent  cereals.  Between  1960  and  1978  the  durum  wheat  yield 
went  up  from  11  to  20  q/ha  and  the  maize  yield  from  30  to 
57  q/ha. 
Under  the  combined  effect  of  variations  in the  areas  sown  and 
increased yields,  the  following  changes  occurred  between  1960 
and  1978  for  the  different  cereals  : 
- a  sharp  increase  in  maize  and  barley  production: 
maize 
barley 
from  5  million  t  to more  than  15  million  t 
from  17  million  t  to  more  than  38  million t 
- a  market  increase  in  production  of  common  and  durum  wheat 
common  wheat  from  28  million  t  to  40  million  t 
durum  wheat  from  1,5  million  t  to more  than  3  million  t 
- a  reduction  in  production  of  rye  and  oats 
~ 
oats 
from  5  million  t  to 
from  13  million  t  to 
3  mi ll  ion  t 
8  million  t - 10  -
C)  Consumption 
Total  cereal  consumption  in  the  Community  of  Nine  rose  steeply 
between  1959  and  1974,  from  90  million  t  to  115  million t. 
The  use  of  cereals  for  human  consumption  is however  declining 
slowly.  Despite  the  population  increase,  it .has  gone  down  from 
around  30  million  t  in  the early sixties to its present  level 
of  28  million t. 
The  increase  in  consumption  is therefore  due  essentially to  an 
increase  in  the  amounts  used  for  animal  feeding  (48  million t 
in  1960/61,  72  million  t  in  1973/74)  and  to  a  smaller  extent 
to  increased  usage  (principally malt  and  starch). 
This  trend  has  reversed  since  1974.  Total  cereal  consumption 
fell  by  4  million  t  between  1973/74  and  1977/78,  as  a  result  of 
a  rapid  growth  in  the  use  of  substitute  products  for  animal 
feeding.  These  products,  which  include  gluten  feed,  citrus 
waste,  oilcake  and  above  all  manioc,  are  imported  into  the  Com-
munity  at  prices  that  are  very  competitive  with  those  of  Commun-
ity -produced  cereals  since  there  are either  no  levies  or  only 
low  ones. 
D)  Trade 
Of  the  common  wheat  sold  on  the  world  market,  9  % is  imported  into 
the  Community  (5.6 out  of  63  million t). The  figure  for  durum 
wheat  is  35%  (1.1  out  of  3  million t), and  for  feed  grain  20% 
(14  out  of  68.5 million t), including  11  million  t  of  maize 
and  2  million  t  of  barley).  The  Community  imports  another  2.5 
million t  of  maize  for  starch  production.  The  greater  part  of 
these  quantities  comes  from  the  United  States. 
Of  the  common  wheat  sold  on  the  world  market,  only  3%  (1.7 
million t)  comes  from  the  Community.  But  export  of  flour  brings - 11  -
the  figure  up  to  9  ~  (5.6 out  of  63  million t).  The  figure  for 
feed  grain  is  4%  (3  out  of  68.5  million t>.  The  Community  ex-
ports  another  2  million  t  of  barley  in  the  form  o•  1"3  million  t 
of  malt.  It  dominates  the  flour  and  malt  markets. 
Except  in  poor  harvest  years  such  as  1975  and  1976  exports  have 
gone  up  more  rapidly than  imports. 
Trade  within  the  Community  of  Six  has  developed greatly since 
the  single  market  was  instituted  in  1967.  By  the  1973/74  mar-
1  keting  year  the  amount  traded  was  over  12  million  t  •  Since 
then  it  has  hovered  around  the  8  million  t  mark  1  but  increased 
again  in  1977/78. 
Enlargement  of  the  Community  opened  a  big  market  principally  for 
wheat  and  maize.  The  relative  smallness of  the  1975  and  1976 
harvests  however  stopped  the expected  upswing  in  trade  taking 
place. 
Common  wheat  (6  million t), barley  (4  million t)  and  maize 
(6  million  t> 2  account  for  most  of  the  trade.  Barley  is the 
only  cereal  in  which  trade  has  not  increased  since  enlargement, 
the  new  Member  States  being  themselves  big  producers. 
III.  ECONOMIC  AND  FINANCIAL  EQUILIBRIUM 
1 
The  Community  of  Six,  and  still more  the  Community  of  Nine,  tra-
ditionally has  a  shortfall  in  cereals.  However  since  1960,  apart 
from  the  exceptional  years  of  1975  and  1976  when  the  harvests  were 
Source  :  EUROSTAT 
2  Average  1973/74 to  1977/78.  Source  EUROSTAT 1 
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very  poor,  Community  production  has  been  going  up  more  rapidly 
than  consumption.  The  Community's  degree  of  autarky  increased 
steadily from  77  ~at the  beginning  of  the  sixties of  over  90  X 
in  1974  1• 
In  1978,  with  a  record  production  of  more  than  110  million t  and 
consumption  which  after declining  for  four  years  stood  at  around 
110  million t, the  Community  was  for  the  first  time  ~lightly in 
surplus. 
This  is the  overall  picture.  For  the  individual  cereals there  are 
variations. 
There  is still a shortfall  of  maize  and  durum  wheat.  Maize  imports 
at the  moment  are  13  million t· and  imports  of durum  wheat  1 mil-
lion t, i.e.  25  X of  requirements.  There  is a  surplus  of  common 
wheat  and  barley  but  certain qualities  (high-gluten  wheat)  continue 
to  be  imported. 
Consequently,  during  the  1978/79  marketing  year,  more  than  15  mil-
• 
lion t  of  wheat  and  barley  will  have  to  be  either exported to non-
member  countries or  put  into  storage. 
Because  of  fluctuations  in the  amounts  harvested it is diff1cult  to 
make  any  accurate  forecast  of  the  future  situation,  but  there  is 
a  general  risk of  a  continuing  surplus  as  a  result  of  two  factors 
a  continued  rise  in production  owing  to  an  increase  in  yields 
and  the  spread  of  higher  yielding  winter  cereals; 
a  continuing  decline  in  consumption  owing  to  an  increasing  use 
of  substitute products  in  animal  feeding. 
Source  FAO  and  EUROSTAT - 13  -
Imports  of  these  products  rose  from  6  million t  in  1973/74 
to  14.5  million t  in  1977/78  1;  during  the  same  period the 
quantity  of  cereals  used  in  ~nimal feeding  went  down,  from 
72  million  t  to  68  million t.  Common  wheat  was  most  affected 
and  barley to a  lesser  extent  while  consumption  of  maize 
stayed practically the  same. 
Despite  the overall  surplus  the  Community  will  continue to 
suffer  a  shortfall of  maize,  the possibilities of  growing  more 
of  which  appear  limited,  and  of  durum  wheat.  It  is  liable on 
the other  hand  to  have  rapidly growing  surpluses  of  barley  and 
common  wheat. 
The  situation becomes  of  even  greater  concern  when  it  is  re-
membered  that  world  market  prices  are  half  the  Community  prices, 
which  are  about  160  ECU/tonne  for  common  wheat  and  barley. 
Disposal  of  Community  surpluses  on  the  world  market  at  high 
refund  rates  is therefore  liable to  absorb  large  amounts  of  Com-
munity  funds. 
Total  FEOGA  expenditure  for  cereals,  as  shown  in  the table on 
page  26  was  625  million  EUA  during  the  period  1975  to  1977.  It 
practically doubled  in  1978  and  the  budget  appropriation  for 
1979  is  1.574  million  EUA. 
This  increase  is almost  exclusively due  to  refund  costs,  which 
rose  from  400  million  EUA  in the  period  1975  to  1977  to 832 
million  EUA  in  1978.  The  budget  appropriation  for  1979  is 
1.209  million  EUA. 
1  In  barley  equivalent 105 
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CHAPTER  II 
COMMON  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  MARKET  AND  ITS  FINANCING 
The  market  in  cereals  was  one  of  the first  for  which  a  com-
mon  organization  was  set  up  (EEC  Regulation  No  19,  4  April  1962). 
The  organization  included  a  Management  Committee,  consisting of 
Member  States'  delegates,  who  would  meet  weekly  to monitor  the 
cereals  market  and  an  intervention agency  in  each  Member  State. 
During  the  transitional  period,  from  30  July  1962  to  30  June 
1967,  a  large  number  of  measures  common  to the  six  Member  States 
were  adopted,  but  the  six  markets  in  cereals did not  form  a  single 
market.  Prices  varied  considerably  from  one  Member  State  to  an  -
other,  so  that  intra-Community  levies  had  to  be  maintained. 
The  end  of  the  transitional  period - 1  July  1967  - marked 
the  changeover  to  the  single  market,  based  on  Council  Regulation 
No  120/67/EEC  of  13  June  1967  on  the  common  organization of the 
market  in  cereals.  (This  Regulation  has  since  been  superseded  by 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2727/75  of  29  October  1975). 
The  common  market  organization  is  based  on  the  principles 
set  out  in  Articles  39  and  110  of  the  Treaty  establishing the  EEC: 
market  stability,  reliable  supplies,  fair  prices  for  producers, 
reasonable  consumer  prices  and  due  regard  for  the  world  market. 
The  target  price  1fixed  for  the  Community  takes  account  of  the 
1intervention price  price at  which  the  intervention  agencies  must 
buy  in  the  products  offered to  them 
Target  price  :  wholesale  price  which  the  common  organization of 
the  market  aims  to guarantee  the  producer 
Threshold  price  :  the  lowest  price  at  which  a  product  from  a  non-
member  country  may  enter  the  Community  to  reach  the  Duisburg 
wholesale  market  at  ncr  less  than  the  target  price - 15  -
abovementioned  conditions,  and  actual  prices  are  guaranteed  with 
the  aid  of  protection  at  frontiers  <threshold prices,  see  foot-
note  page  14)  and  internal  market  support  (intervention price,  see 
footnote  1  page  14).  The  Community  preference  in  respect  of  supply 
is  thus  assured  up  to  the  threshold price  Level,  and  obligatory 
buying-in  at  the  intervention price,  subject  to  certain quality 
criteria  being  met,  guarantees  producer  prices  for  the  main  types 
of  cereal. 
I.  THE  PRICES  SYSTEM 
1 
A)  The  prir.es  system  up  to  1976 
The  basic  rules  pro~ided for  a  single  intervention price per 
cereal,  but  with  regional  differentiation to  reflect differ-
ences  in  natural  conditions  of  market  formation. 
The  prices  hierarchy  for  cereals,which  affects the threshold 
price,was  decided  on  without  reference  to  the  nutritional  value 
of  each  cereal,  which  led  to  imports  of  certain types  of  cer-
eal,  thereby  modifying  the  market  conditions  for  Community 
cereals. 
This  prices  system  and  the  resulting  hierarchy  failed there-
fore  to  stabilize  market  prices  at  the desired  Level,  i.e. 
between  the  intervention price  and  the target  price,  as  is 
shown  by  a  number  of  intervention  measures.  1 
B)  The  new  prices  system 
This  situation  led  to  a  new  system  for  fixing  intervention 
prices  for  the  principal  types  of  cereal  from  the  1976/77 
marketing  year  onwards,  the  aim  being  better  balance  between 
Common  wheat  1.268  million  t  in  1973/74  and  2.057  million t  in  1974/75 
0.139  million  t  in  1973/74  and  0.133 million  t  in  1974/75 
0.365  million  t  in  1973/74  and  0.065  million tin 1974/75 
Rye 
Barley - 16  -
the  various  branches  of  production  on  the  basis of  real  mar-
, 
ket  requirements,  without  affecting  producers'  incomes.  The 
system  is often  called the  "silo system"  because  of  the  shape 
of  the  diagram  used  to  represent  it  (see  table  on  page  27). 
The  system  is based  on  the  fact  that  the  bulk'of  cereals pro-
duced  in  the  Community  is  used  as  Livestock  feed.  ALL  cereals, 
with  the  exception  of  durum  wheat,  compete  with  each  other  for 
this use. 
The  feed  grain  market  is  in deficit  and  dependent  on  maize  im-
ports,  whereas  there  is  a  surplus  of  common  wheat.  The  new 
system  should  permit  the  use  of  surplus  common  wheat  to meet 
market  requirements,  without  the  need  for  permanent  intervention 
measures. 
The  reform  is  based  on  the  fixing  of  a  common  single  interven-
tion price  for  the  most  important  fodder  cereals. 
The  reform  also  aims  to establish criteria to be  applied  in 
fixing  the  target  price  (and  hence  the  threshold price)  which 
reflect  more  accurately  the  nutritional  value  of  the  various 
categories  of  cereals,  their  respective  market  values  and  the 
Community  preference. 
The  system  also established different  prices  for  different 
qualities of  common  wheat,  thus  laying  the  foundations  of  a 
policy  to  improve  quality,  made  necessary  by  the  increased 
cultivation of  high-yield varieties of  poor  quality  for  bread-
making.  Quality protection is  ensured  by  fixing  a  reference 
I 
price  for  common  wheat  of  bread-making  quality,  permitting 
, 
optional  intervention  in  respect  of  that  quality  of  wheat. - 17  -
The  difference  between  the  intervention price  and  the  reference 
price  is  calculated to  cover  the  difference  in  yield  between 
non-bread  wheat  and  bread  wheat. 
II.  THE  PRESENT  INTERVENTION  SYSTEM 
A)  Market  regulation  measures 
The  market  is  supported  by  basic decisions  on  such  matters  as 
intervention,  target  and  threshold prices  (see  III  A),  which 
are  increased  monthly,  and  by  management  decisions  entailing 
direct,  specific  action to prevent  anticipation of  market 
trends.  Such  measures  are  private  storage  aid  and  interven-
tion measures  in  respect  of  common  wheat  of  bread-making  qual-
ity. 
1.  Private  storage  aid 
When  there  is  an  adverse  market  trend,  the  Commission  can 
propose  that  holders  of  stocks  of  all  cereals  sign  storage 
contracts  in  which  they  undertake  to  keep  a  certain quantity 
for  a  given  period  in  return  for  payment  of  a  special  pre-
mium.  The  Community  thus  avoids  having  to  buy  in  massive 
quantities  because  prices  have  fallen. 
2.  Measures  relating  specifically to  common  wheat  of  bread-making 
quality 
1  FEOGA 
These  special  measures  include  private  storage  aid  accom-
panied  by  a  right  of  preemption  by  the  intervention  agency 
at  the  end  of  the  storage  period to prevent  speculative  storage 
at  the  expense  of  the  FEOGA  1• 
A second  measure  is  buying-in  by  the  intervention  agencies  at 
the  reference  price.  This  can  be  confined  to  certain  regions 
and  to  a  certain  period  of  time. 
European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund - 18  -
A third measure  enables  the  Commission  to purchase  by  tender-
ing  procedure  at  the  reference  price  a  certain quantity of 
bread  wheat  having  certain qualitative  and  t~chnical charac-
teristics. 
3.  Carry-over  payments  at  the  end  of  the  marketing  year 
Intervention prices,  which  are  increased'each  month  during 
the  first  ten  months  of  the  marketing  year,  are  normally 
higher  at  the  end  of  one  marketing  year  than  at  the  begin-
ning  of  the  next.  To  forestall  massive  intervention as  a 
result  of  a  sharp  drop  in the  price  of  cereals,  the  Council 
has  power  to  award  a  carry-over  payment  to  make  up  the dif-
ference.  This  payment  may  not,  however,  exceed the  difference 
in  the national  currency,  between  the  target  price  valid 
for  the  last  month  of  the  marketing  year  and  that  for  the 
first  month  of  the  new  marketing  year. 
4.  Intervention buying-in,  storage  and  remarketing 
The  intervention agencies  must  buy  in  the  cereals offered 
at  the  intervention price,  provided  that  they  are  offered in 
appropriate  quantities  and  are  of  the  right  qualities. 
The  cereals  must  be  resold  under  a  tendering  procedure  open 
to  any  interested party. 
Two  methods  of  disposal  are  available 
- resale  on  the  EEC  market.  To  avoid  a  deterioration  in 
market  prices,  the  resale price  must  be  equal  to the 
Local  market  price  and  must  not  be  less  than  the  inter-
vention  price  plus  1.50 u.a./tonne; - 19  -
- resale  for  export.  The  terms  for  each  operation  are  Laid 
down  by  the  Commission,  advised  by  the  Management  Committee. 
These  price  terms  must  be  similar to  those  for  exports  from 
the  free  Community  market. 
B)  Transfer  from  one  intervention  agency  to  another 
Besides  the  basic  rules  governing  management  of  the  market,  the 
Council  adopted  in  1973  a  measure  authorizing  the transfer  of 
cereals  from  one  intervention  agency  to  another  to  restore  a 
normal  supply  situation to  regions  of  the  Community  which  have 
a  cereals  deficit  and  traditionally  import  cereals  and  which 
were  faced  with  the  shortage  on  the  world  market  and  the  re-
sulting  sharp  rise  in  prices. 
Other  such  measures  have  been  adopted  on  several occasions 
since  1973. 
C)  Production  refunds 
Because  of  the  special  situation on  the  market  in  starch-based 
products,  a  production  refund  is granted  so  that  the  basic 
products  can  be  offered to processors  at  prices  Lower  than 
those  resulting  from  the  application of  levies  and  common  prices. 
D)  Aid  in  respect  of  durum  wheat 
As  it  was  proving  impossible  to  give  durum  wheat  producers 
adequate  guarantees  by  fixing  a  price  wpich  took  account  of 
the  price  differential  normally  existing  between  common  and 
durum  wheat  on  the  world  market  while  still respecting  this 
differential  as  far  as  possible  in  the  Community  because  of - 20  -
the possibility of  substitution,  aid  was  granted  for  the  pro-
duction of  durum  wheat,  according  to quantities  produced. 
In  view  of  the  rise  in  the  Community  production of  durum  wheat, 
it  was  no  longer  justified to grant  uniform  aid to  all  produ-
cers.  However,  with  a  view  to encouraging  an  increase  in  pro-
ductivity  and  an  improvement  of  the  quality  of  this product, 
aid  was  maintained  for  certain  regions  and  for  durum  wheat  having 
certain qualitative  and  technical  characteristics making  it suit-
able  for  the  manufacture  of  pasta. 
III.  TRADE  WITH  NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES 
A>  Import  measures 
Cereals  from  non-member  countries  are  subject,on entry  into the 
Community,  to  a  levy  which  is  based  on  the  difference  between 
world  market  prices  and  the  Community  threshold price. 
B)  Export  measures 
1.  The  export  refund 
Cereals  prices  are  usually' higher  in  the  Community  than  on 
the  world  market.  To  restore  conditions  of  normal  competi-
tion and  enable the  Community  to take  part  in  world  trade, 
refunds  are  granted to exporters to  bring their export  pri-
ces  in  line  with  those obtaining  on  the  world  market. 
To  ensure  fuller  control  over  the  quantities  ~xported,  some 
cereals  are  exported  by  way  of invitation to  tender  for 
the  refund. - 21  -
Unlike  the  Levy,  the  refund  is  not  automatic  and  when  it  is 
applicable  the  amount  and  conditions  reflect  the  Community's 
commercial  policy  as  well  as  the  difference  between  Community 
prices  and  world  prices. 
2.  The  export  levy 
However,  in  the  event  of  a  world  shortage,  supplies  may  be 
so  short  that  Community  prices  may  become  more  attractive 
to purchasers  in  non-member  countries.  Export  levies  are  then 
charged  over  and  above  Community  export  prices.  This 
measure  has  been  implemented  for  only  a  few  months,  in  1974  and 
1975. 
C)  Licences 
Trade  in  cereals  with  non-member  countries  requires  a  licence 
issued  by  the  Member  States to applicants  therefore  the  li-
cence  must  be  presented to the  customs  authority  of  each  Member 
State.  The  applicant  may  request  at  the  same  time  the  advance 
fixing  of  the  levy  or  refund  to  cover  himself  against  fluctu-
ations  in  world  prices  at  the  time  of  the  transaction. 
D)  Safeguard  clause 
There  is  a  safeguard  clause  to enable  the  Commission  to  adopt 
under  an  emergency  procedure  any  appropriate  measures,  should 
trade  with  non-member  countries  be  disturbed  by  exceptional 
circumstances. - 22  -
The  balance  between  resources  and  requirements  is such  that  a  . 
few  factors  (USA  crops,  unusual  weather)  are  enough  by  them-
selves  to generate  wide  variations  in prices.  In  these cir-
cumstances,  the  authorities  have  power,  under  the  safeguard 
clause,  to  restrict or discontinue  altogether the  issue of 
licences  and  to  reduce  or  abolish  the  levies or  refunds  or 
their  advance  fixing. 
IV.  MONETARY  COMPENSATORY  AMOUNTS 
When  the  French  franc  was  devalued  in  1969,  this  raised problems 
with  regard  to the  alignment  of  agricultural  prices.  An  immed-
iate  adjustment  of  agricultural  prices on  the  basis of  the  new 
rate  would  have  caused  a  substantial  rise  in  agricultural  prices 
in  France.  It  was  decided  to  introduce  monetary  compensatory 
amounts on  the  understanding  that  they  would  be  phased  out  as  the 
periodical  price  adjustments  took  effect. 
From  1971  onwards,  some  Member  States  allowed  their  currencies 
to float,  with  the  result  that  agricultural  prices  expressed  in 
units  of  account  converted  into national  currencies  at  the  rate 
declared  to  the  IMF  no  Longer  coincided  with  the  prices  conver-
ted  at  market  rates  •  But  an  alignment  on  uniform  prices  calcu-
Lated  at  market  rates  would  have  caused  price  increases  regarded 
as  excessive  for  consumers  in  some  Member  States  and  reductions 
prejudicial  to  farmers'  earnings  in  others. 
MCAs  had  to  be  introduced to  cushion  the  impact  on  the u.a.  rates 
on  intra-Community  and  extra-Community  trade.  Council  Regulation 
No  974/71  established the  MCAs  to  make  up  the difference  between 
intervention prices  based  on  the official parity  (used  in  the  CAP) 
and  the  real  parity.  For  this  reason,  MCAs  are  calculated only  in 
national  currencies.  They  are  adjusted periodically to  take  account 
of  currency  fluctuations.  The  price differences  are  reduced  when - 23  -
prices  are  adjusted  each  year  due  to  changes  in  the  u.a.  con-
version  rates  (green  rates).  Green  rates  were  introduced  on 
1  February  1973  when  the  new  Member  States  joined the  Commun-
ity  and  were  later extended  to  the  other  Member  States. 
In  1979  the  inauguration  of  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS) 
brought  the  amounts  down  to  some  extent.  However,  while  the 
present  situation  continues,  the  Member  State  with  the  stronger 
currency  levies  MCAs  on  imports  and  grants  them  on  exports, 
and  the  Member  State  with  the  weaker  currency  charges  MCAs  on 
exports  and  grants  them  on  imports  of  basic  and  processed  agri-
cultural  products. 
The  value  of  MCAs  on  processed  products  is  further  adjusted  by 
a  coefficient  applied  to  the  MCAs  on  the  basic  products  which 
they  contain.  This  aspect  is  considered  more  fully  in  Chapter  IX. 
V.  FINANCING  OF  THE  CEREALS  SECTOR  (see  table  on  page  26) 
Total  FEOGA  guarantee  expenditure  on  cereals  remained  stable  in 
absolute  terms  between  1975  and  1977.  It  represents  13  % of 
overall  guarantee  expenditure  in  1975  and  9.2 % in  1977. 
Since  then  it  has  risen steeply,  accounting  for  12.8% of  guar-
antee  expenditure  in  1978,  and  is estimated  at  15.1  % in  the 
1979  budget. 
This  unfavourable  trend  is  almost  entirely due  to the  rising 
cost  of  refunds;  intervention expenditure  remained  relatively 
stable  between  1973  and  1979. - 24  -
A)  Export  refunds 
In  1974  expenditure on  refunds  was  far  lower  than  in  1973 
because  of  the  situation on  the  world  market,  to the  extent 
that  export  levies  had  to  be  introduced  in  1974  because 
world  prices  were  higher  than  Community  prices. 
After  a  period of  stability from  1975  to  1977,  expenditure 
on  refunds  rose  sharply  in  1978.  The  reason  was  the  increase 
in quantities  exported  and  the  higher  rate of  refund.  One 
of  the  reasons  for  mounting  exports  is the  increasing  prefer~ 
ence  of  consumers  for  substitute products,  which  means  more 
exports  of  Community  feed  grains. 
B)  Intervention 
Intervention expenditure  stayed  relatively stable at  250-320 
million  EUA  between  1974  and  1978. 
1.  Carry-over  payments 
The  differences  in  tar~et prices  converted to national  cur-
rencies  (including  monthly  increases)  from  one  year  to  the 
next  since  1975  and  the  poor  harvests  in  1975  and  1976 
meant  that  such  measures  did not  have  to be  adopted,  but 
carry-over  payments  did  have  to be  reintroduced  for  the 
1978/79  marketing  year. 
2.  Buying-in  and  subsequent  operations 
Intervention purchases  and  sales  account  for  a  relatively 
low  total  compared  with  the  import~nt economic  function 
of  these  measures  <support  of  the  guaranteed  minimum 
price)~owever, the  poor  harvests  in  1975  and  1976  helped 
to  keep  intervention costs  at  these  levels. - 25  -
3.  Production  refunds 
The  drop  in  expenditure  since  1974  is due  to  a  change  in 
the  method  of  calculation of  the  refund  (see  Chapter  V). 
4.  Aid  in  respect  of  durum  wheat 
This  is  a  relatively  stable  item  of  expenditure  since  it 
has  depended  since  1976  on  the  area  sown  with  durum.  The 
apparent  fluctuation  is  mainly  a  matter  of  variations  in 
the  time  taken  to make  payments. FEOGA  GUARANTEE  SECTION  EXPENDITURE  ON  CEREALS 
mi  l lion  EUA 
I 
1973  1  1974  2  2  1975  1976 
Total  expenditure  1.051,4  383,0  589,3  655,9 
REFUNDS  542,2  66,5  329,9  403,4 
INTERVENTION  (measures  to  regulate  in- 509,2  316,5  259,4  252,5 
ternal  market) 
Aid  to  private  storage  +  other  measures  - - - 15,6 
Subsidies  for  the  import  of  fodder  1,2 
grain  in  Italy 
0,4  0,4  0,4 
Carry-over  payments  31,1  3,5  0,5  - 0,1 
Denaturing  +  incorporation  5  128,7  16,4  0,3  -
Buying-in  and  consequent  measures  52,1  32,1  64,5  102,6 
Production  refunds  6 
185,4  194,8  90,6  51,2 
Aid  to durum  wheat  110,7  69,3  103,1  82,8 
I 
12  month  period 
Adjusted  for  the  MCAs  included  in  the  refunds 
Budget  appropriations  for  1979  having  regard  to draft  amending  budget  No.  3 
Appropriations  of  Council  Draft  Budget 
1977 
629,9 
365,7 
264,2 
1,4 
0,6 
-
- 0,1 
51,0 
76,7 
134,6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Measure  discontinued  on  1  August  1976  by  Article  3  of  Council  Regulation  No  1143/76, 
amending  Article  7(3)  of  Council  Regulation  No  2727/75 
6 
Including  production  refunds  for  potato starch,  rice  starch  and  broken  rice  for  brewing 
1978 
1.112,5 
831,9 
280,6 
-
2,2 
13,0 
0,1 
59,4 
117,0 
89,0 
1979  3 
--
1.574,2 
1.209,4 
364,8 
-
1,6 
35,8 
-
65,8 
135,2 
126,4 
I 
: 
Note  For  comparability, the  figures  have  been  converted  into million  EUA,  taking  account,  where  necessary, 
of  the  effect  of  the  double  rate 
4 
1980 
1. 727, 5 
1.243,5 
484,0 
17,9 
2,9 
106,4 
-
88,5 
145,9 
122,4 
! 
-·- ---+-
N 
o-- 27-
THE  SILO  SYSTEM  IN  ITS  FINAL_FOR~ 
common  wheat 
130~-
rye  barley  maize 
I 
Ill 
~----~------~!----D-~120 
Market  com-
ponent  for  com-
mon  wheat  for 
breadmaking  ,syh 
Specific  inter-,  \  I 
vent ion  for  .~:~--~  .... 
common  wheat 
for  breadmak1ng 
Difference  in 
yield between 
tRe  two  qual  -
it ies 
150' 
~ 
)6%•  nl 
I 
1 
4%  r~ 
I 
'10% 
Component  taking 
account  of  · 
"tional  value 
_  J_ILJ  !  I  -1 ( 2'·  v  100  ~-"''C:J-!'""'I::.:.:----:.=!I~zat:J..:~=-:::::ar"X:::a.C~-=~-=3!:-==-C:•100 Common 
.  ~  B  F  intervention 
Cc5mpulsory  inter  ..  - price 
VIE!ntion  KEY 
0  ..  Theoretical  market  price  in  ~ain  surpl~s·region 
0  :  Theoretical  market  price  in  main  deficit  region 
:. Regional  component  :  freight  cost  between  surplus  ~egion and  deficit 
j  :  Bread  wheat 
F :  Feed  grain - 28  -
CHAPTER  III 
MARKET  REGULATION  MEASURES 
SECTION  I  - INTERVENTION  BUYING  AND  SUBSEQUENT  MEASURES 
To  guarantee  the  minimum  producer  price,  the  common 
organization  of  the  market  in  cereals provides  for  the 
intervention  agencies  to  buy  in  stocks  of  agricultural  produce, 
the  cost  (i.e.  the  difference  between  the  buying  in price  and 
the  selling price,  storage  costs  and  interest  on  national  funds 
tied  up  by  buying  in  the  produce)  being  borne  by  FEOGA. 
Between  1973  and  1978  the  average  annual  cost  of  this policy 
was  60  M EUA.  This  amount  represents  8.2Y.  of  the  average  annual 
expenditure  in  the  cereals  sector  in  general  in  that  period, 
I 
and  19.2%  of  expenditure  on  internal  market  regulation  measures 
<see  table  p.  26). 
A)  Management  of  the  intervention  system 
1.  Summary  of  the  rules 
According  to  the  basic  regulation  on  cereals  (Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No.  2727/75),  the  intervention  agencies 
are  obliged  to  buy  in  any  cereals  which  have  been 
harvested  in  the  Community  and  which  are  offered  to  them, 
provided  that  the  offers meet  certain  conditions  as  to 
quality  and  quantity.  Intervention  agencie~ buy  in  at  the 
single  intervention price.  If  the  quality  of  the  cereal 
differs  from  the  standard quality for  which  the - 29  -
intervention  price  is  fixed,  the  price  is  adjusted  in 
accordance  with  a  scale  of  increases  or  reductions. 
The  intervention price  is  subject  to monthly  increase 
from  the  second  month  of  the  marketing  year  until  the 
tenth  month  to allow,  at  Least  in part,  for  the  cost  of 
storage. 
Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  376/70  stipulates that 
if  the  goods  are  remarketed  the  selling price  must 
correspond  to  the  local  market  price,  adjusted  for  the 
quality  increases  and  reductions.  However,  the  goods  may 
be  remarketed  only  if  the  selling price  exceeds  the 
intervention price plus  1.50 u.a./tonne. 
2.  Application  of  the  intervention  system 
(a)  Legal  and  administrative  conditions  of  intervention 
Under  the  Community  rules,  the  intervention  agencies 
buy  in  cereals  at  the  intervention price,  adjusted  for 
any  increase  on  reductions  for  quality,  and  sell  them 
at  the  Local  market  price,  also adjusted  for  any 
quality  incr~ase or  reductions. 
However,  the  intervention  system  applied  in  one  Member 
State differs  in  its  implementation  from  that  in  the 
other  Member  States,  as  laid  down  by  Community  rules, 
in  that  the  interventions  agency  concerned  does  not 
itself  buy  in  cereals  but  commissions  private - 30  -
undertakings  to do  so  under  a  storage/purch~se 
contract.  The  starer/buyer  is the  owner  of  the  goods, 
but  he  has  no  choice  in  the matter  of  vendor  when  the 
goods  are  taken  into  intervention or  of  purchaser  when 
the  products  are  remarketed,  vendor  and  purchaser  being 
designated  and  the  basic  price  being  fixed  by  the 
intervention  agency. 
Quality  increases  and  reductions  are,  however,  freely 
negotiated  between  the  starer/buyer  and  the  vendor  or 
purchaser.  In  its accounts  the  intervention  agency 
enters  the  cereals  bought  in or  sold at  the price  for 
the  standard quality,  i.e.  it does  not  record  the 
quality  increases  or  reductions.  This  is the  amount 
which  is entered  in  the  FEOGA  account,  rather  than  the 
actual  ~rice, which  is  based  on  the  real  quality. 
(b)  Quantity  loss 
According  to  statements  recorded  in  the  Council  minutes 
when  Regulation  (EEC)  787/69  on  the  financing  of 
intervention expenditure  was  adopted,  the  Member  States 
are  supposed  to  take all appropriate  measures  to 
prevent  products  bought  in  by  the  Community  from 
deteriorating.  As  regards  quantities of  cereals  in 
storage,  this principle  was  embodied  in  the  Regulation 
on  the  financing  of  intervention expenditure  by  the 
institution of  a  tolerance  of  0.31..  Any  quantity  loss 
beyond  this tolerance  is to  be  borne  by  the Member 
State.  The  Member  State  may  choose  not  to  apply  the - 31  -
tolerance,  in  which  case  the  standard amount  granted 
for  storage  is  increased  by  0.3r.  of  the  intervention 
price. 
In  the  event  of  accidental  loss,  the  Memher  State  bears 
the  consequences.  The  standard  amount  for  storage 
granted  to the  Member  State  contains  a  component 
representing  the  cost  of  insurance  against  loss  or 
damage.  The  Member  State is free  to take  out  an 
insurance  policy  or  to  be  his  own  insurer.  The  sharing 
of  responsibility  between  th~ intervention  agency  and 
the  stores  is spelt  out  in  the  storage  contract 
concludedbetween  them.  The  content  of  the  contract 
may  vary  from  one  Member  State to another.  The  starer/ 
buyer  <see  (a)  above)  accepts  responsibility for  any 
quantative  loss  other  than  that  arising  from.natural 
disasters. 
In  the  event  of  deterioration due  to  such  phenomena, 
the  financial  responsibility  is a  matter  for  discussion 
between  FEOGA  and  the  intervention  body  of  each 
Member  State. 
(c)  Problems  relating  to quality 
- Depreciation  of  goods 
In  the  statements  referred to  in  (b),  the  Member 
States  also assumed  certain  responsibilities  for 
preserving  quality.  Although  no  regulation  lays 
down  the precise  scope  of  this responsibility,  it 
has  become  the practice for  the Member  States  to 
bear  financial  loss  resulting  from  a  deterioration 
of  the  products  in  storage  due  to the  conditions  of 
storage  or  carriage.  However,  if the deterioration - 32  -
·~·· 
is due  to prolonged  storage  for  which  the  intervention 
agencies  are  not  responsible,  FEOGA  then  bears  the 
financial  consequences. 
But  interpretations may  differ  in  such  situations. 
- Improvement  of  quality 
FEOGA  bears  the  cost  of  certain operations  for  preservation 
(drying,  homogenization,  cold  st~rage, etc.).  Where  there 
is  an  improvement  in quality  as  a  result  of  these 
measures,  the  FEOGA  benefits.  The  Committee  has,  however, 
not  been  able  to establish, on  the basis of  the  costs 
of  the  various  processes  and  of  the  advantages  accruing 
with  regard to preservation  and  improvement  (if  any) 
in  quality  whether,  from  the  financial  point  of  view, 
certain processes  should  be  preferred to others. 
In  the  Member  State mentioned  earlier,  FEOGA  does  not 
finance  any  operations  for  preservation or  quality 
improvement;  on  the  other  hand,  it is not  entitled to 
any  profit  that  may  result.  These  operations  are 
financed  by  the  storer/buyer  who  benefits  from  them 
at  the  time  of  sale. 
8)  The  cost  of  intervention 
FEOGA  grants  a  standard  payment  for  the  duration  of  storage 
and  the  tonnage  actually  stored,  expressed  in  tonne/months. - 33  -
The  standard  payment  represents  the  weighted  average  of  unit 
costs  of  the  various  intervention  agencies. 
The  Committee  notes  that  some  regions  are  at  a  disadvantage 
because  the  costs  of  storage,  entry  and  removal  vary.  Some 
installations are  more  efficient  than  others  and  the  degree 
of  competition  may  vary.  Intervention  storage  is  a  major 
factor  in  one  Member  State,  and  practically non-existent  in 
others,  and  this affects  the price  asked  by  starers. 
The  Committee  has  therefore  been  unable  to  make  a  direct 
comparison  between  intervention  costs  in  the  Member  States. 
While  it  is  certainly  arguable  tnat  the  standard-payment  system 
is  not  completely fair,  it must  oe  conceded  that  the  weighted 
average  has  the  advantage,  in  comparison  with  real  costs, 
of  providing  an  incentive  for  the  highest-cost  interventior1 
agencies  to  obtain  the  Lowest  costs  from  the  starers. 
C)  Procedure  for  remarketing 
1.  Rem~rketing on  the  internal  market 
(a)  Summary  of  the  rules 
The  intervention  agencies  remarket  cereals  in  their 
possession  by  tendering  procedure.  They  are  free  to 
is3ue  an  invitation to  tender.but  must  observe  the 
following  rules: 
- they  must  notify  the  Commission; 
- they  must  publish  invitations to tender  to ensure 
equality of  access  and  competition; 
- they  must  observe  the  Local  market  price at  the 
place  of  storage  at  the  time  of  sale.  If that  price 
is  lower  than  the  intervention price plus  1.50  u.a. - 34  -
the  sale  is postponed  to prevent  prices  from  falling 
to  the  intervention price  Level; 
- in  special  cases,  provided  for  by  regulation  376/70, 
cereals  may  be  offered  for  an  intervention  centre 
other  th~n that  where  they  are  stored.  The  criteria 
regarding  the  resale price  to  be  observed  are  those 
applicable  to that  centre.  If  the  most  favourable 
transport  costs  between  the  place  of  storage  and  the 
place  of  destination  exceed  the  most  favourable 
transport  costs  between  the  intervention  centre  of 
resale  and  the  place  of  destination,  the difference 
is  refunded  by  the  intervention  agency. 
(b)  Management  proolems 
The  Commission's  staff  have  stressed that  the  remarketing 
of  stocks  is a  matter  for  the  national  intervention 
agencies  and  that  the  Commission  cannot  therefore 
intervene directly  where  there  is  a  disequilibrium 
between  surplus  and  deficit  markets. 
The  ~ublication cf  invitQtions  to tender  takes  different 
forms  in  the  individual  Member  States, particularly 
as  regards  time-Limits  for  tendering. 
Differences  of  view  as  to the  Local  market  price  may 
arise  because  the  intervention  agency  and  the  Commission 
do  not  always  use  the  same  sources  of  information. 
In  the  cases  referred  to  in  Regulation  376/70  where 
cereals  ~an be  bid  for  in  re~~ect  of  a  marketing 
Ler.tre  other  than  that  ~here the>  dre  stored, 
evaluation  of  trar.sport  costs  is  Left  to  the  intErvention • 
- 35  -
agencies  under  the  conditions  referred to  in  (a) • 
Methods  of  caLculation  vary  from  one  intervention 
agency  to another. 
2.  Remarketing  for  export 
(a)  Summary  of  the  rules 
Issue  of  an  invitation to  tender  is  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Management  Committee,  which  9elivers 
an  opinion  when  a  Member  State  submits  on  application. 
The  Commission  decides  what  quantities  should  be  put 
up  for  tender,  selects the  storage  regions  concerned 
and  the  Location  for  which  the  minimum  resale price 
is  valid  and  for  which  the  tenders  must  be  submitted 
and  also  fixes  the  de,adline  by  which  tenders  must  be 
in. 
The  minimum  price  is  fixed  at  a  Level  which  will  not 
interfer  with  other  exports. 
(b)  Management  difficulties 
In  view  of  the prices  tendered  for  certain  cereals, 
specially  rye,  the  demand  for  which  on  the  world 
market  is not  strong,  the  Commission  often  has  to 
refuse  aLL  tenders  to prevent  the  col Lapse  of  market 
prices  and  then  has  to initiate a  new  tendering 
procedure.  Disposal  of  some  lots  may  thus  take  several 
months  or  as  much  as  a  year. 
D)  Recommendations 
1.  Allocation  of  responsibility  for  protection  from 
deterioration 
The  Committee  finds  that  the  rules  do  not  adequately 
define  the  respective  obligations  of  the  national - 36  -
intervention  agencies  and  the  Commission  in  regard  to  the 
protection  of  merchandise  from  deterioration.  It notes 
that  preparatory  work  has  begun  with  a  view  to  improving 
the  rules  governing  the  financing  of  quantity  losses  and 
depreciations  of  quality. 
The  Committee  recommends  that  the  rules  specify  more 
clearly  the  obligations  of  each  party  and  the  arrangements 
and  procedures  that  must  be  followed  in  the  event  of 
dispute. 
2.  Remarketing 
The  Committee  recommends  verification of  the  extent  of 
the  difficulties  reported  by  the  Commission's  staff  in 
connection  with  the  degree  of  independence  enjoyed  by 
intervention  agencies  when  remarketing  was  necessary 
because  of  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand.  The 
Committee  recommends  that,  as  appropriate,  the  necessary 
proposals  should  be  put  forward. 
The  Committee  agrees  with  the observations  made  by  the 
Court  of  Auditors  in  its annual  report  (1).  The 
remarketing  operation  does  take  a  Long  time.  The 
Committee  recommends  that  action  be  taken  to make  more 
rapid  remarketing  possible,  thus  ensuring  better 
management  of  FEOGA  funds. 
It  has  also  been  noted  that  subordinate  procedures  left 
in  the  hands  of  the  intervention agencies  vary  from  one 
Member  Stat~ to another.  The  Committee  recommends  the 
introduction  of  measures  harmonizing  the  methods, 
especially  those  relating  to  the  advertising  of  calls 
for  tender. 
(1)  OJ  C 313,  30  December  1978. - 37  -
SECTION  II  - SPECIAL  INTERVENTION  MEASURES  (PRIVATE  STORAGE) 
Private  storage  measures  are  decided  only  for  a  Limited 
period  which  depends  on  the  market  situation.  The  cost  is 
therefore  very  variable  from  one  marketing  year  to another. 
(see  table  on  page  26). 
A)  Summary  of  the  rules 
Article  8  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  2727/75  provides  thati  in 
order  to prevent  substantial  buying  in,  the  Commission  may 
adopt  certain  intervention  measures  allowing  private 
individuals  or  organizations  to  conclude  cereals  storage 
contracts  for  a  given  period  with  the  intervention  agency. 
Storage  procedures  established  by  regulations  may  vary 
from  one  season  to  another  and  require: 
- either  that  the  beneficiary must  undertake  not  to  use 
the  quantities  under  contract  during  the  period prescribed 
to avoid  overburdening  the  market.  He  receives  the  whole 
premium; 
- or  that  the  beneficiary  may  resell  his  stocks  before  the 
end  of  the period,  provided  he  has  obtained  agreement  in 
advance. from  the  intervention  agency.  He  will ·then  receive 
only  that  part  of  the  premium  corresponding  to  the  actual 
period  of  storage. 
B)  Irregularities 
There  have  been  instances  of  irregularities.  The  intervention - 38  -
agencies  have  had  to  reduce  or  cancel  the  premium  due  after 
ascertaining  that  certain quantities  were  missin~.  Because 
cereals  are  stored  on  the  recipient's permises,  the  risk  of 
substitution or  removal  is  high.  The  attention of  the 
inspection  departments  must  therefore  be  drawn  to the  need 
for  supervision  of  both  quality and  quantity  ~o prevent 
substitution  with  lower  quality cereals and  to prevent  some 
or  all of  the  stock  being  used  before  the  expiration  of  the 
prescribed period. 
C)  Recommendations 
1.  Economic  implications  of  the  legislation 
The  Committee  notes  that  in  certain types  of  contract 
the  storer  can  sell  his products  before the  contract 
runs  out,  provided  he  has  the  authorization  of  the 
intervention agency,  while  leaving  the  cost  of  storage 
for  the period  held  to  be  borne  by  FEOGA. 
It notes  that  for  common  wheat  of  bread-making  quality, 
the  Commission  has  power  to adopt,  concurrently  with 
the  measures  described  at  point  A,  a  measure  entitling 
the  intervention  agency  to purchase; at  the  end  of  the 
contract, all or part  of  the  quantity  concerned,  to 
thwart  speculation. 
The  Commission  recommends  that  the  economic  implication 
of  the  present  legislation be  reviewed  in  the  light  of 
the  rules  applicable  to wheat  of  bread-making  quality, 
with  a  view  to achieving  more  efficient management. - 39  -
2.  Prevention  of  irregularities 
The  Committee  notes  that  if  contracts  are  broken  or  terms 
are  disregarded  there  is no  provision  for  Community  penalty, 
except  that  the  aid  is  withdrawn  <however,  penalties  are 
applicable  in  some  Member  States).  It  recommends  that  a 
system  of  providing  security  be  introduced,  as  in  many 
other matters  covered  by  Community  Law,  in  order  to deter 
the  beneficiary  from  any  attempt  to fraud,  under  penalty 
of  the  security  being  forfeit  to  FEOGA. 
SECTION  III  - CARRYOVER  PAYMENTS 
Each  year  the  Council  decides  whether  carry-over  payments 
are  to  be  made.  The  cost  of  this measure  varies  substantially 
according  to  the  rate  paid  and  the  quantities still  in  storage 
at  the  end  of  the  year.  In  1973  the  expenditure  was  31,1  M EUA 
and  in  1978  13M  EUA,  whereas  it  was  virtually nil  between  1975 
and  1977  (see  table  p.  26). 
A)  Summary  of  the  rules 
Article  9  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2727/75  provides 
that  a  carry-over  payment  may  be  granted  in  respect  of 
stocks  remaining  at  the  end  of  the  marketing  year.  As  prices 
for  the  previous  marketing  year  will  have  been  increased 
every  month  for  10  months  and  will  normally  be  higher  than 
those  for  the  new  marketing  year,  there  is a  danger  of  a 
heavy  inflow  of  cereals  into  intervention.  The  purpose  of - 40  -
the  carry-over  payment  is to  compensate  for  such  a' situation. 
The  carry-over  payment  may  be  granted  in  respect  of  common 
wheat,  rye,  barley  and  maize  harvested  in  the  Community,  and 
of  malt  in  storage  at  31  July. 
Cereals  in  storage  at  the  end  of  the  marketing  year  (31  July) 
are generally  speaking  held  by  merchants  or  the  processing 
industry.  The  carry-over  payment  is therefore granted  at 
that  stage. 
~ince harvests  are  early  in  some  regions  of  the  Community 
and  appropriate  checks  have  to  be  made,  applicants  from 
these  regions  are  required  to  submit  a  stock  declaration 
two  months  before  the  end  of  the  marketing  year,  i.e. 
31  May. 
8)  Control  problems 
1.  Declaration  before  31  May 
The  declaration  required  of  applicants  by  31st  May  does 
not  exempt  them  from  making  the declaration  on  31  July. 
Applicants  in  other  regions  have  to make  the  latter 
declaration only.  This  distinction  between  applicants 
has  applied  only  since  the  end  of  the  1978/79 marketing 
year,  its object  being  to  save  the  intervention  agencies 
unnecessary  work.  But  all  the  applicants  have  to declare 
the  origin  of  stocks  at  31  July  so  that  invoices  can  be 
checked.  If  any  quantity  has  originated  in  one  of  the 
regions  where  the obligation  to make  the early declaration 
applies,  the  goods  must  have  been  declared  at  31  May  in 
order  to qualify for  the  payment.  This  procedure  is  less 
time-consuming  than  the  former  one  and  could  achieve 
similar  results, provided  that  those  responsible  for - 41  -
control  are  even  more  vigilant  during  transit  operations 
around  the  date  of  eligibility  (31  July). 
2.  Check  on  stocks  and  movements 
The  payment  is granted  in all  countries  of  the  Community 
where  prices  in  national  currency fall  at  the  start  of 
a  new  marketing  year.  For  maize,  however,  it is granted 
only  in  areas  of  surplus  production.  There  is therefore 
a  risk  of  artificial transfers  from  one  region  to another 
in  order  to  qualify  for  the  aid,  or  of  disruption  of 
transport  flows  as  the  date  of  eligibility for  the 
allowance  approaches.  Stock  movements  should  be  carefully 
checked  during  this period. 
For  an  applicant  to  receive  aid  his  application  must  have 
been  submitted  before  7  August  showing  the  stocks  of 
cereals  at  31  July.  Physical  checks  on  stocks  at  31  July 
therefore  becomes  impossible  except  where  31  May  stock 
declarations  are  required. 
Besides,  taking  into  account  the  small  amount  of  time 
available  and  the  number  of  concerns  involved,  the  relevant 
authorities  can  undertake  only  very  limited  stocks  checks 
these  being  Long  and  difficult  operations. 
The  competent  authority  of  each  Member  State undertakes 
the  requisite  checks  on  stocks  and  movements  thereof  on 
its territory.  The  measures  are  taken  at  the  initiative 
of  each  Member  State,  for  there  is no  Community  regulation. 
The  results  of  controls  are  not  systematically  compared 
with  those  of  other  Member  States.  Certain  Member  States - 42  -
do,  however,  apply  bilateral  conventions  enabling  them 
to  combat  fraud  effectively. 
3.  National  arrangements 
In  addition,  one  Member  State applies  a  special  principle 
for  determining  whether  cereals  in transit  qualify  for 
aid.  They  are treated  as  if they  were  still at  the 
departure  store until  they  arrive at  the  buyer's  silos. 
But  the  Community  regulations  lay  down  two  conditions 
for  qualification for  the  payment.  The  first  concerns 
the  ownership  of  the  stocks.  It  is the  owner  of  stock 
on  31  July,  determined  under  the  terms  of  the sales 
contract  (thus,  the  purchaser  or  the  seller)  who  receives 
the  payment.  The  second  condition  is the  location  of  the 
cereals  on  31  July.  The  practice mentioned  can  thus  lead 
to  resultsnot  in  line  with  the  regulations  when  the 
ownership  has  been  transferred to the purchaser  in  the 
departure  store.  A case  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Committee  illustrates this aspect.  Merchant  A sold  maize 
to merchant  B,  who  is  a  national  of  another  Member  State 
in  which  the  payment  was  not  being  granted  for  maize. 
The  barge  reached  customs  three  days  befort  the  entry 
into force  of  the  allowance  in  the  Member  State of  origin. 
The  shipping  agent  has  received  instructions  from  the 
operator  to  wait  three  days  before  completing  the  customs 
formalities,  solely,  it would  seem,  in  order  to qualify 
for  the  aid. 
C)  Recommendations 
1.  Quantity  checks 
The  payment  is  made  at  the  time  of  collection,  sale  or 
processing,  and  therefore  to  firms  which  must  have - 43  -
accounts.  Physical  controls of  stocks  on  31  July  are 
therefore  impossible,  except  in  the  Member  States  in  which 
a  declaration  on  31  May  is  required.  In  addition,  checks 
made  at  a  Later  date  are  Limited  bec~use of  lack  of  time,  the 
Large  number  of  firms  and  the  time  taken  up  by  the 
operations. 
The  Committee  recommends  that  checks  of  accounts  at 
beneficiary  firms  be  stepped  up  in  order  to determine 
the  quantities  of  cereals qualifying  for  aid.  These  checks 
could  be  carried  out  along  the  Lines  of  the  Directive  of 
27  June  1977  relating  to  the  verification of  operations 
financed  bY  the  FEOGA  guarantee  section  (1). 
2.  Checks  on  transit  operations 
The  Committee  notes  that  there  is a  very  substantial 
danger  of  fraud  in  respect  of  cereals  in  transit  around 
the  date  of  eligibility for  the  allowance.  It:takes the 
view  that  transit  operations  must  be  verified  by  comparing 
the  data  in  the  hands  of  the  official departments  and 
that  checking  the  consignors  and  the  con~ignees is  the 
only  way  of  coping  with  the  danger  of  double  payments. 
These  checks  are  all  the  more  necessary  in  that  the 
obligation to make  a  preliminary declaration  on  31  May 
has  been  eliminated  in  most  Community  regions.  The 
Committee  therefore  recommends  fuller  cooperation  between 
the  relevant  agencies  in  the  Member  States with  a  view 
to  improving  the  control  of  transit  operations. 
3.  National  administrative practices 
The  Committee  notes  that  certain administrative practices 
relating  to transit  between  Member  States are  Liable  to 
(1)  Council  Directive  No  77/435,  OJ  L  172  of  12  July  1977, 
p.  17 - 44  -
generate difficulties. 
It  recommends  that  these practices  be  reviewed  with  a 
view  to ensuring  that  they  are  in  Line  with  the objectives 
of  the  Community  regulations. - 45  -
CHAPTER  IV 
TRANSFERS  OF  CEREALS  BETWEEN  INTERVENTION  AGENCIES 
The  Committee  would  point  out  that  its terms  of  refer-
ence  do  not  cover  an  assessment  of  the  economic  justifications 
of  the  common  organization of  the  market  in  cereals.  It  has 
therefore  studied  the  problems  arising  from  transfers  only  from 
the  administrative  and  technical  angles. 
In  July  1973  a  Member  State  informed  the  Council  and 
the  Commission  that  the  supply  of  wheat  to  users  and  consumers 
in  its  southern  regions  was  hampered  by  serious difficulties. 
This  was  the  result  of  the  world  shortage.  The  supply 
situation  was  becoming  increasingly difficult  and  wheat  prices 
were  climbing.  This  gave  rise  to  speculation,  with  common 
wheat  being  stockpiled  for  sale  Later  at  higher  prices. 
This  special  situation necessitated  special  measures 
for  the  sale~ at  very  short  notice,  of  a  large  quantity  of 
common  wheat  held  by  the  intervention  agency  of  the  Member  State 
concerned.  By  way  of  derogation  from  the  rules  on  sale  by 
tendering  procedure,  the  Council  authorized  sales  of  a  total 
of  107  000  tonnes  of  cereals  by  private  contract. - 46  -
These  quantities  proved  insufficient  to  restore  the 
supply  situation to normal;  it  was  therefore  necessary to make 
available to the  intervention  agency  some  common  wheat  still 
held  by  the  intervention  agencies  of  some  of  the  other  Member 
States  so  that  these  products  could  be  offered  for  sale  in  the 
regions  suffering  from  shortages. 
This  first  transfer  was  followed  by  several  others 
between  1976  and  1979. 
SECTION  I  - RULES 
A)  The  rules  relating  to transfers 
1.  Council  Regulations 
-Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2104/73  of  1  August  1973 
<consolidated  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2737/75  of  29 
October  1975) 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  150  000  t  of  common 
France  47  000  t  of  common 
Belgium  3  000  t  of  common 
total  200  000  t  of  common 
--------- ---------
wheat 
wheat 
wheat 
wheat - 47  -
- Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  873/76 of  13  April  1976 
(amended  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1022/76  of  30  April 
1976) 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  130  000  t  of  common  wheat 
France  100  000  t  of  common  wheat 
Belgium  35  000  t  of  common  wheat 
Net her lands  35  000  t  of  common  wheat 
total  300  000  t  of  common  wheat 
========= 
- Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1863/76 of  27  July  1976 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
60  000  t  of  barlet 
40  000  t  of  common  wheat 
not  suitable  for 
breadmaking 
The  quantities  actually  supplied  were  80  000  t  of  barley 
and  20  000  t  of  common  wheat  not  suitable for  bread-
making. 
-Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  564/77  of  15  March  1977 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  300  000  t  of  common  wheat  suit-
able  for  breadmaking 
261  000  t  were  actually  supplied. 
- Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2255/77 of  11  October  1977 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  200  000  t  of  common  wheat  suit-
able  for  breadmaking 
A total  of  961  000  tonnes  of  common  wheat  for  breadmaking,  80  000 
tonnes  of  barley  and  20  000  tonnes  of  non-bread  common  wheat  has 
thus  been  supplied. - 48  -
2.  Commission  Regulations 
Commission  Regulations  (EEC)Nos  733/77  and  2452/77  laid 
down  detailed  rules  for  the  implementation of  Council 
Regulations  (EEC)  Nos  564/77  and  2255/77  respectively. 
B)  The  content  of  the  Regulations 
1.  The  first  Regulation  (No  2104/73)  specified  : 
-the time  limits  for  the  removal  of  the  goods, 
-the maximum  quantity  available, 
-the responsibility of  the  receiving  intervention 
agency  from  the  moment  the  product  was  delivered 
-the accountancy  and  financial  conditions,  i.e.  : 
•  the  value  of  products  Leaving  the  supplying  interven-
tion  agencies'  warehouses  and  the  value  of  products 
entering  the  warehouses  of  the  receiving  intervention 
agency  were  to  be  shown  in  the  accounts  as  zero 
entries, 
•  transport  costs  were  to  be  borne  by  FEOGA, 
•  the  rules  on  MCAs  were  not  applicable, 
- and  the  conditions  relating  to  sale 
•  products  could  be  sold  by  private  contract,  by  way 
of  derogation  from  the  tendering  procedure, 
•  the  responsibility of  the  receiving  Member  State  for 
ensuring  that  the  products  were  used  for  the  purposes 
specified, 
•  a  minimum  selling price. 
2.  The  Regulation  relating  to  the  second  transfer  (Regul-
ation  (EEC)  No  873/76  Laid  down,  in  addition  to  the 
conditions  mentioned  above,  that  the  tendering  procedure - 49  -
was  to  be  employed  for  assigning  delivery  operations 
and  specified  certain  conditions  relating  to  the  in-
vitation to tender. 
The  Regulation  also gave  indications  as  to the  place 
of  delivery  so  as  to  avoid  excessive transport  costs, 
and  restored the  normal  rules  of  sale  (i.e.  by  tender-
ing  procedure)  which  had  been  abandoned  under  the 
first  tra~sfer. 
3.  The  two  1977  tr~nsfers were  gcverned  by  Commis$ion 
Regulatio~s  (implemen~ing the  Council  Regul~tions) 
-the  Council  Regulations  added  to  the earlier  regul-
ations  a  quality  requirement  for  the  product  and  pro-
vided  for  a  decision  by  the  FEOGA  Committee  on 
financial  problems  if necessary. 
- The  Commission  Regulations  laid  down  the  rules 
relating  to  coordinat~on between  th~ intervention 
agencies  concerned  and  the  fin~ncial  detail~. 
SECTION  II  - OPERATIONAL  DIFFICULTIES 
The  difficulties  encountered  in this type  of 
operation  ~an be  truccd  through  the  improvements  which  have 
gradually  been  made  to  the  reg~lations governing  transfers. 
A)  Delays  in  ~aking over  the  cereals 
The  greatest  difficulties  were  due  to the  quantities 
to  be  transported,  given  the  time-Limits  for  take-over. - 50  -
In  th~ case  of  the  first  transfer  for  instance ;t was  neces-
sary to  resort  to  a  take-over  "on  paper"  as  it  was  very  dif-
ficult  to  transfer  such  a  large  quantity  within  such  a 
short  period  Qf  time. 
The  receiving  intervention  agency  accepted  consignments  which 
did  not  satisfy the  normal  requirements  of  its market,  espe-
cially as  regards  moisture  content,  because  the  time  available 
for  sampling  operations  forced  its officers to  agree  to the 
produce  being  collected  without  the  quality declaration  being 
verified. 
8)  Organization  of  transfer 
This  was  left  to the  supplying  and  receiving  intervention 
agencies,  which  themselves  invited tenders  tor  the  work  from 
public  or  private  undertakings. 
1.  Tendering  tor  the  transfer operation 
A number  of  operators  complained  that  they  had  had  no  op-
portunity  to  tender  tor  the  transport  of  the  cereals,  with 
the  result that  the  conditions  had  to be  republished 
several  times  and  the  quantities to  be  transported split 
up  into  lots. 
Because  of  the  quantities to  be  transported  and  the  time-
limits  laid  down,  few  carriers  were  eligible.  The 
accepted  tender  price  was  thus  necessaril~ the  result  of 
a  specialized  and  therefore  extremely  restricted  form  of 
competition. - 51  -
2.  Geographical  distribution of  departure  and  arrival  points 
Since  the  deadlines  imposed  at  the  time  were  very  short, 
consultation  between  intervention  agencies  proved diffi-
cult.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  later transfers,  con-
sultation  was  improved  and  the  transport  arrangements  could 
be  made  more  rational. 
More  generally,  the  geographical  distribution of  the 
transferred  cereals  in  the  receiving  Member  State  was  de-
pendent  on  the  availability  of  storage  space  and  the  capa-
city  of  the  milling  industry;  in  some  cases  part  of  the 
cereals  transferred  went  to  areas  not  suffering  from  the 
most  severe  shortfalls. 
3.  Transport  difficulties 
The  geographical  distribution of  the  stores  made  necessary 
a  large  number  of  transport  operations  within  certain 
supplying  Member  States  and  the  receiving  Member  State, 
accompanied  by  the  splitting  up  of  consignments,  trans-
shipment  and  intermediate  storage. 
This  state of  affairs  naturally  resulted  in  considerable 
cost  to  FEOGA.  Generally  speaking  the  quantities  fixed 
and  the  short  deadlines  acted  against  the  efficiency 
of  the  operation. - 52  -
C)  Storage difficulties 
Some  cereals deteriorated  in the  stores of  the  receiving 
Member  State.  Where  damage  was  caused  by  parasites,  the 
origin of  the  infestation  could  not  be  establtshed.  Some 
storage  warehouses  were  not  equipped  for  prolonged  storage 
of  cereals  from  other  Member  States.  The  moisture  content 
of  cereals  produced  in  other  Member  States  is  substantially 
higher  than  that  normally  found  in the  regions  concerned; 
the  equipment  of  stores  in  these  regions  is  suitable  for 
the  quality  of  local  wheats  but  is  inadequate  for  the  pro-
longed  storage  and  treatment  of  wheat  from  other  regions 
with  different  characteristics. 
D)  Delays  in  selling the  cereals  <see  t~e pa~e 56) 
The  periods  between  the  Council  decision  authorizing  the 
transfers  and  sale of  the  cereals  in  the  receiving  Member 
State  varied  from  several  months  to over  a  year.  About 
25  X of  the  total  amount  was  sold within  a  relatively 
short  time,  but  some  quantities  were  not  sold until  after 
the  next  harvest.  Two  years  and  one  and  a  half  years 
respectively  after  the  adoption  of  Regulations  (EEC)  Nos 
564/77  and  2255/77,  37  X of  all the  cereals transferred 
were  still in store. 
In  this  connection,  the  authorities of  the  receiving  Member 
State  stressed that  the  main  objective  was  the  psychological 
pressure  on  the  market,  created  by  the  physical  presence  of 
the  cereals,  not  their  prompt  marketing. - 53  -
E)  Difficulties  on  resale 
The  regulations  governing  transfers  stipulate  that  the 
selling price  must  be  equal  to  the  local  market  price. 
This  clause  in  fact  applies  to  all  reselling  of  intervention 
cereals. 
On  several  occasions  (see  table  page  57)  sales  took  place  at 
prices  considerably  Lower  than  Local  market  prices,  some-
times  10  % or  15  % lower.  The  widest  disparities  observed 
were  in  the  prices  of  fodder  grains. 
It  should  be  pointed out,  however,  that  there  are difficulties 
in  comparing  the  prices  fetched  for  transferred produce  and 
those  for  local  produce  by  reason  of  the different  characte-
ristics of  the  cereals  concerned.  The  Commission  staff there-
fore  allow  for  a  margin  to  cover  the  resulting difference  in 
value  when  calculating  the  prices  which  should  be  obtained 
for  the  cereals transferred. 
F)  Transport  costs 
For  transfers  based  on  the  following  Regulations  transport 
costs  were  as  follows 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No  2104/73  :  Lit  27  944/  tonne,  or 
Lit  5,539  milliards  for  the  198  208  tonnes  supplies; 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No  873/76  :  Lit  33  640/  tonne  or 
Lit  9,998  milliards  for  the  297  217  tonnes  supplies; - 54  -
- Regulation  (EEC)  No  1863/76  :  Lit  42  076/tonne  or 
Lit  4,172  milliards  for  the  99  164  tonnes  supplied; 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No  564/77  :  Lit  49  172/tonne or  Lit 
12,849 milliards  for  the  261  315  tonnes  supplied; 
- Regulation  (EEC)  No  2285/77  :  Lit  41  682/tonne  or 
Lit  8,336  milliards  for  the  199  999  tonnes  supplied. 
These  costs  seem  too  high.  The  main  reasons  have  already 
been  mentioned  :  scattered distribution of  departure  and 
arrival  points,  limited  number  of  specialized transport 
firms,  short  deadlines  for  the  transfer operations. 
In  addition,  there  is  normally  a  price  difference  between 
surplus  areas  and  deficit  areas  if only  due  to the  cost 
of transport.  Since  transport  costs  are  borne  by  the 
FEOGA  this difference  is  no  Longer  discernible  in  the 
final  price  of  the  products  transferr~d.  The  Committee 
wonders  what  effects this  could  have  on  the  operation 
of  the  free  market. 
SECTION  III  - RECOMMENDATIONS 
The  Committee  has  emphasized  the difficulties of 
organizing  transfers  and  the  high  cost  of  the  operation. 
The  Committee  considers  that  one  of  the  objectives 
of  the  common  organization of  the  market  is to ensure  normal 
supplies  in  the  Community's  deficit  areas  and  that  transfers 
should  be  confined  to exceptional  situations. - 55  -
Should  the  Council  decide  on  another  transfer,  the 
Committee  recommends  that  the  intervention  agencies  concerned 
prepare  immediately  a  concerted  plan  for  the  collection  and 
storage of  the  cereals  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  quantities 
transferred  are  properly  related to  the  collection  and 
storage  facilities  in  the  regions  in  question,  even  if this 
procedure  means  that  the  transfer  takes  longer. 
This  coordination  should  also  enable the  intervention 
agencies  to  define  precisely the  characteristics of  the  cereals 
to  be  transferred,  so  as  to  avoid  any  dispute. Cereals  Regul-
ation  No 
Common  wheat  2104/73 
Common  wheat  873/76 
Barley  1863/76 
Common  fodder  wheat  1863/76 
Common  wheat  suitable  for  564/77 
bread-making 
Common  wheat  suitable  for 2255/77 
bread-making 
TOTAL  CEREALS 
QUANTITIES  OF  TRANSFERRED  CEREALS  IN  STORE 
ON  26  APRIL  1979 
Date  Tonnes  Delivery  Sold 
taken  t  t 
1.  8.73  200  000  198  208.093  198  208.09 
13.  4.76  300  000  297  217.627  297  217.62 
27.  7.76  80  000  79  324.978  79  324.97~ 
27.  7.76  20  000  19  839.342  19  839.341 
15.  3.77  300  000  261  315.144  141  038. 00( 
11.10.77  200  000  199  999.000  149  196.99~ 
1  100  000  1  055  904.184  884  825.03S 
Average  Amount 
price  Lit 
Lit/t  million 
98  050  19  434 
159  400  47  376 
135  930  10  782 
140  000  2  779 
177  924  25  094 
185  000  27  600 
150  386  133 _065 
Quantities  in 
store  on 
26.4.79 
-
-
-
-
120  277.144 
so  802.002 
171  079.146 
. 
IJ1 
o-
1 - 57  -
SALES  AT  LESS  THAN  LOCAL  MARKET  PRICES 
1.  Common  wheat  of  bread-making  quality 
date  :  24  February  1977 
quantity  awarded  :  36  572  tonnes 
average  selling price  :  5.45%  below  the  market  price 
2.  Common  wheat  of  bread-making  quality 
date  :  6  April  1977 
quantity  awarded  :  61  689  tonnes 
average  selling price  :  7.97%  below  the  market  price 
3.  Barley 
date  :  21  April  1977 
quantity  awarded  :  about  6  GOO  tonnes 
average  selling price  :  19.35  % below  the  market  price 
4.  Barley 
date  :  28  April  1977 
quantity  awarded  :  66  372  tonnes 
average  selling price  :  14.8 i.  below  the  market  price 
5.  Common  fodder  wheat 
dhte  :  28  April  1977 
quantity  awarded  :  3  342  tonnes 
average  selling price  :  14.8%  below  the  market  price 
6.  Common  wheat  of  bread-making  quality 
date  :  19  May  1977 
quantity  awarded  :  about  32  000  tonnes 
average  selling price  :  about  8%  below  the  market  price 
7.  Common  wheat  of  bread-making  quality 
date  :  1  June  1977 
quhntity  awarded  :  51  852  tonnes 
selling prices  :  about  11  i.  below  the  market  price. 
NOTE 
The  sales  referred to  in points  1,  2,  6  and  7  were  covered  by 
the  same  award  decision;  the  average  price obtained  was 
Lit  155  127  per  tonne.  The  price difference  in  percentage 
terms  results  from  the  rise  in  market  prices  between  the dates 
of ·sales. - 58  -
CHAPTER  V 
PRODUCTION  REFUNDS 
Until  1974  the  production  refund  rate  was  calculated 
on  the  basis  of  the  difference between  a  fixed  supply price 
and  the  threshold price  of  the  cereal  in question.  Since  the 
threshold  price  rose  at  regular  intervals,  the  refund  rose 
accordingly.  Between  1967  and  1974,  the  refund  rate  for 
maize  almost  doubled  from  20.38 u.a./tonne  to 39.45  u.a./ 
tonne.  On  1  August  1975,  the  fixed  supply  price  system  was 
replaced  by  a  system  of  fixed  refunds  at  a  rate  lower  than 
those  applied  before that  date.  This  new  method  explains 
why  budget  expenditure  dropped  from  an  average  of  190  m EUA 
in  1973  and  1974  to  an  average  of  84  m EUA  in  1975-1978  (1) 
(see  table on  p.  26),  t.e.  only  32  % of  intervention ex-
penditure  in  that  period. 
SECTION  I  - RULES 
A  Products  supported 
The  ninth  recital  of  Council  Regulation  N°  2727/75, 
which  replaces  Council  Regulation  N°  120/67,  states  that 
"in  view  of  the  special  market  situation for  cereal 
(1)  Including  refunds  for  production of potato  starch,  rice 
starch  and  broken  rice  for  brewing. - 59  -
starch, potato starch  and  glucose produced  by  the  'di-
rect  hydrolysis'  process,  it  may  prove  necessary to 
provide  for  a  production  r~fund of  such  a  natur~ that 
the  basic  products  used  by  this  industry  can  be  made 
available to  it  at  a  lower  price than  that  resulting  from 
the  application of  the  system  of  levies and  common  prices". 
The  Regulation  therefore  grants  production  refunds 
for  maize  and  common  wheat  used  in  the  Community  for 
the  manufacture  of  starch, 
- for  potato  starch, 
- for  maize  groats  and  meal  used  in  the  Community  for  the 
manufacture  of glucose  by  the  "direct  hydrolysis"  pro-
cess. 
Council  Regulation  N°  2727/75  had  discontinued pro-
duction  refunds  for  maize  and  common  wheat  used  for  the 
manufacture  of  quellmehl  and  for  maize  from  which  groats 
and  meal  used  in  brewing  are  manufactured.  Following  a 
judgment  handed  down  by  the  Court  of  Justice of  the 
European  Communities,  Council  Regulation  N°  1125/78 
reintroduced temporarily  a  production  refund  for  maize 
and  common  wheat  used  for  the  manufacture  of  quellmehl, 
but  only  where  the  quellmehl  was  to  be  used  for  bread-
making,  and  for  maize  used  for  the  manufacture  of groats 
and  meal  used  by  the  brewing  industry. 
Council  Regulation  N°  1665/77,  amending  Council  Re-
gulation  N°  2742/75,  ruled out  production  refunds  for 
isoglucose,  which  can  be  extracted  from  starch. - 60  -
B)  The  refund  procedures 
The  starch  industry  has  enjoyed  FEOGA  support  since 
1962.  The  production  refund  arrangements  as  such  were 
introduced  by  Council  Regulation  N°  120/67,  but  the 
payment  pro~edures have  been  changed  several  times. 
From  1  July  1967  to  31  July  1968,  the  production 
refunds,  in  the  absence  of  any  specia~ arrangements  with 
regard  to the  payments,  were  generally paid to  industries 
a  posteriori, i.e.  on  the basis  of  declarations  concer-
ning  the quantities  of  products processed. 
On  1 August  1968,  Commission  Regulation  N°  1058/68 
provided  for  advance  payment  of the production  refund 
for  potato starch. 
At  the  same  time,  Commission  Regulation  N°  1060/68 
allowed  manufacturers  to  claim  an  advance  production  re-
fund,  provided  they produced  proper  evidence  that  the 
maize  or  common  wheat  eligible for  aid  was  held  by  them 
in  their  premises  or  under  official  control  and  provided 
they  put  up  a  security of  105  % of the  refund  advanced. 
This  arrangement  worked  until  31  July 1974.  From 
1 August  1974  onwards,  Commission  Regulation  N°  2012/74 
provided  that  the  payment  of the production  refund  must 
be  made  by  the  competent  agency  appointed  by  the  Member - 61  -
States  when  the  claimant  produced  proper  evidence  that 
the basic  product  had  been  placed  under  official  super-
vision  and  when  he  declared  himself  prepared  to provide, 
on  request,  all  information  necessary  for  such  super-
vision. 
Having  been  optional,  this arrangement  became 
compulsory. 
C)  Arrangements  for  the  release of  the deposit 
Regulation  N°  1060/68  authorized the  release of the 
security only  when  the manufacturer  had  provided proper 
evidence  that  the  cereals  had  been  processed  within 
90  days  following  that  of  the payment  of  advance.  If 
such  evidence  was  not -provided,  the  security  was  forfeit. 
In  addition,  for  maize  processed  into groats  and 
meal  for  beewing,  the  security  was  released only  when 
evidence  had  been  provided of  the  sale of the  relevant 
products  to  a  brewery. 
However,  the  way  in  which  the  evidence  should  be 
provided  was  not  defined  in  the  Regulation. 
Regulation  N°  2012/74  filled this gap.  The  security 
would  be  released only  when  the  claimant  produced  pro-
per  evidence that  at  Least  96  % of the quantity of the 
basic  product  had  been  processed  within  90  days - 62  -
following  the  date  of  the  acceptance  of  the  application 
for  entry  into official supervision. 
For  maize  processed  into,  groats  and  meal  for  the 
manufacture  of  beer  or  the  manufacture  of glucose  by 
the  "direct  hydrolysis"  process,  the  security  was  to  be 
released only  when  the  claimant  had  submitted  an 
application  accompanied  by  a  copy  of  his  invoice  of  sale 
to  a  brewery  or  to  a  glucose  manufacturer  using  the 
direct  hydrolysis  process. 
The  Member  States  were  required to  check,  by  appro-
priate  controls,  that  the  products  concerned  had  indeed 
been  used  for  the  purpose  stated. 
The  Regulation  also provided  for  compliance  with 
certain quality  conditions. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  was  to  be  notified of 
the  control  and  analysis  methods  necessary  for  the  im-
plementation of  the  Regulation,  and  of  any  change  in 
these  methods. 
Commission  Regulation  N°  2026/75  replaced  Regulation 
N°  2012/74.  As  a  result  of  Council  Regulation  N°  2727/75, 
certain  items  were  deleted  from  the  list of  products 
eligible  for  refunds  and  the  related  control  requirements 
ceased  to  apply.  However,  following  the  reintroduction 
of  refunds  for  quellmehl  for  breadmaking  and  for  groats 
and  meal  for  brewing  Commission  Regulation  N°  1570/78 - 63  -
reproduced  the  main  control  requirements of Regulation 
N°  2012/74. 
In  addition,  since  Regulation  N°  1665/77  (amending 
Regulation  N°  2742/75)  prohibited any  pr.oduction  refund 
for  isoglucose,  the  Member  States are  required to  ve-
rify the  quantities of  isoglucose  manufactured,  in 
order  to  recover,  where  appropriate,  the  corresponding 
production  refund  advanced  in  respect  of  the basis pro-
ducts  used. 
SECTION  II  - DIFFICULTIES  IN  APPLYING  CONTROLS 
Under  the  present  arrangements,  the  Member  States• 
controls  must  ensure  : 
- with  regard  to  starc~es, 
•  that  the  processing  of 96%  of the quantities of 
maize  and  common  wheat  placed  under  official  super-
vision  has  indeed  been  carried out  within ninety 
days  following  that  of  the  acceptance of  the  appli-
cation for  supervision, 
that  the  refund  is  recovered  in  respect  of  any  pro-
duction  of  isoglucose  ; 
- with  regard  to groats,  meal  and  quellmehl, 
•  that  at  Least  96  % of the  product  has  indeed been 
processed  within  ninety  days, 
•  that  the  products  for  which  a  refund  is applied  for 
meet  quality  requirements  or  are  in  Line  with  the - 64  -
definition given  in the  Regulation, 
•  that  the groats  and  meal  haven  been  delivered to  a 
brewery,  a  glucose  manufacturer  using  the  direct 
hydrolysis  process or  a  bakery. 
A)  Official  supervision 
1.  Placing  goods  under  official  supervision 
a)  Start  of  supervision 
The  Regulations  do  not  say  when  official  super-
vision takes effect, nor  the  conditions to  be 
fulfilled by  the  interested party.  The  only  requi-
rement  is that  96  % of  the  consignment  of  the 
basic product  must  be  processed.within  a  maximum 
period of  90  days  after the  date  of  acceptance  of 
the  application for official  supervision.  It  is 
not  specified whether  supervision  starts at  the 
time  of  acceptance,  at  the  time  of  submission  of 
the  application or  at  any  other  time.  Nor  is it 
specified where  the  goods  must  be  located  when 
supervision starts. 
So  supervision  may  start  before  acceptance of the 
application,  when  the  goods  have  not  yet  reached 
the  processing  plant. - 65  -
However,  some  Member  States delay  supervision 
until  the  application  has  been  accepted  and  the 
basic products  are  in  specified silos at  the plant. 
Others  recognize  the date  of  submission  of  the 
application or  its entry  in  an  official  register, 
which  may  precede  the  unloading  of  the  basic 
products. 
These  practices do  not  seem  to  take  due  account  of 
the  time  and  quantity  limits  for  the  processing  of 
each  consignment  of  basic  product. 
b)  Quantity  controls  on  entry 
In  one  Member  State, procedure  is  based on  a 
concession  system,  which  requires  that  the  merchan-
dise  be  stocked  separately  from  other  merchandise 
and  which  enables  approved  agencies  to  have  it 
weighed.  Control  is,  however  by  sample.  In  another 
Member  State,  the  product  is  placed  in  a  reserved 
silo which  is  supervised by  officials of  the  inter-
vention  agency  concerned.  In  a  third Member  State, 
the  consignments  are  inspected prior to  acceptance 
of  the  application.  These  practices  enable  each 
consignment  to be  separately  identified,  but  at 
the beginning  of  the  process. 
In  the other  Member  States,  the  entry  into official 
supervision begins  without  inspection of  the 
consignments  at  the  beginning  of  the  processing 
operation.  However,  in  one  of  them,  a  number  of the - 66  -
processing  firms  are  located  in the ports  and 
the merchandise  is placed under  the  same  supervi-
sion  as  that  of  inward  processing traffic. 
Stock  accounts  and  documents  are  verified on  the 
spot  in all the  Member  States.  In  most  of  them, 
inspections  are  frequent  (two  to  three  times  a 
month)  ;  in  one  case,  however,  the  responsible 
agencies  organize  verifications  only one  a  year. 
2.  Control  of  guality and  processing 
a)  Control  of guality 
Disparities between  Member  States  in  determining 
the  date  of entry  into official  supervision  are 
accentuated by  disparities  in  the  control  of  qua-
lity of  the basic products. 
The  Community  rules  do  not  state explicitly 
whether  the basic product eligible for  a  refund 
must  meet  any  quality  requirements. lhey  specify 
only  that  96%  of the  maize  placed under  official 
supervision must  be  processed  into starch within 
90  days. 
This  rule  is  interpreted differently  in  the 
various  Member  States. 
One  group  of  States,  and  with  them  the  Commission, 
takes  the  view  that  the  product  for  which  the 
advance  refund  has  been  paid must  not  contain more - 67  -
than  4  % of  broken  grains  and  impurities  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  only  whole  grains  can  be 'processed 
into starch.  This  interpretation is  Logical  because 
it  would  be  distinctly  wrong  for  the  same  refund 
to  be  paid  on  a  product  containing  20  r.  impurities 
and  broken  grains  as  on  a  product  containing  2  %. 
This  interpretation  has  fairly  clearcut  consequences. 
If  the  maiz~ under  official supervision,  for  which 
the  refunds  has  been  paid  in  advance,  contains 
slightly more  impurities  and  broken  grains  than 
the  maximum  4  %,  the  security - which  is  105  /.  of 
the  advance- is withheld  in  a  proportion  equal 
to  the  difference  between  the  amount  constituted 
and  the  refund  due.  For  instance,  in  the  case of 
maize  containing  4.1.  %of  impurities  and  broken 
grains,  the  processor  will  be  penalized  under  this 
rule  at  a  rate  of  84.70 u.a./tonne of  maize. 
A second  group  of  Member  States  interprets  the 
rules  very differently and  considers  that  the  96  /. 
criterion  means  simply  that  most  of the  product 
under  supervision  is  to  be  processed  within  90  days  ; 
since  the  separation of  impurities  and  broken 
grdins  from  whole  grains  forms  part  of  the  proces-
sing  stage,  these  Member  States  consider  that  there 
is  no  quality  requirement  in  the  rules,  and  that 
the  same  refund  is  due  per  tonne  of  maize  processed, 
whatever  the  level  of  impurities  and  broken  grain. - 68  -
These  differences  in the  application of  the  rutes 
by  the  Member  States distort  the  conditions  of 
competition  between  processors  and  have  repercus-
sions  on  FEOGA  expenditure.  The  Committee  found 
that  information  with  regard  to  the  scope  ~f the 
rules  had  not  always  circulated satisfactorily 
between  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  For 
instance,  when  one  Member  State  asked  how  the 
rules  of  96  X and  90  days  had  to be  applied,  the 
Commission's  answer  was  not  sent  to the other 
Member  States  as  well. 
b)  Control  of processing 
The  rules  seem  to  require  controls  over  the 
processing of  each  consignment  of products  under 
official  supervision.  In  most  cases,  such  control 
is  impracticable because  the  main  starch  manu-
facturers  work  24  hours  round  the  clock  and  the 
maize  quantities placed  under  supervi~ion are  not 
held  separately  but  stored  as  and  when  they  are 
delivered on  the  silos  ;  they  are  also  used  as 
and  when  needed  for  the various  types  of  production. 
The  result  is that  : 
- firstly,  there  is  no  way  of  establishing  that 
any  given  consignment  placed  under  supervision 
on  any  given  day  has  been  processed on  a  given 
date  into a  given  product.  In  other  words,  the 
absolute  link  between  a  given  quantity ot  basic - 69  -
product  placed  under  supervision  and  the  product 
emerging  from  its processing  cannot  be  properly 
verified  ; 
secondly,  there  is  no  way  of  assessing  the 
quantity of  broken grains  contained  in  each 
consignment  of  product  used,  since,  in practice, 
the  product  is  placed  under  supervision  as  soon 
as  it  arrives  in  the  factory,  i.e. before  clea-
ning  operations prior to processing.  The  weight 
of  the  broken grains,  siftings and  waste  is 
determined  only  after  separation  and  sale of 
the  broken grains  and  does  not  refer  to  a  given 
consignment  placed under  supervision,  but  to  a 
group  of  consignments. 
In practice,  inspection  is  Largely  confined  to 
the  stores  accounts.  The  actual  use  of  the 
products  placed under  supervision  can  be  verified 
as  can,  consequently,  the  justification for  the 
granting  of  the  production  refund  for  all the 
quantities  used  during  any  given period,  but  this 
cannot  be  done  consignment  by  consignment,  as 
required  by  Regulation  N°  1570/78,  which  cannot 
be  applied  here. 
c)  Difficulties  when  rates  change 
It  is  the  rate of  refund  in  force  on  the  day  of 
acceptance  of  the  application  which  is  paid to 
the  manufacturer.  When  the  rate  is  changed, 
however,  it  is the  day  of processing  which  is 
referred to  for  the  application of the  new  rate. - 70  -
As  already  indicated,  the  process  is "continuous" 
and  rate  changes  can  lead to  disagreements 
between  the  inspectors  and  the processors  as  to 
what  amount  of  basic product  had  already  been 
processed at  a  given day  at  0  hours.  Processing 
criteria also  lead  to differences of opinion. 
3.  Inspection  of  isoglucose production 
The  basic product  for  isoglucose  production  is not 
eligible  for  the  refund  and  sums  paid  in  advance 
must  therefore be  recovered.  The  amounts  to  be 
recovered  vary  according  to  whether  maize  starch, 
common  wheat  starch or  maize  groats  and  meal  were 
used.  Supervision of  isoglucose  production  is  an 
extremely  complex  matter,  given  the diversity of 
chemical  processes  used  for  the  manufacture  of 
this product, the  Lack  of  permanent  monitoring  and 
the  variety of  manufacturing  techniques  which  make 
it  impossible to  relate  the quantities of  isoglu-
cose  produced to  a  given  basic  product.  The  amount 
to  be  recovered  therefore  has  to  be  calculated by 
the  method  least  favourable  to the beneficiary. 
In practice,  recovery  of  the  sums  is based  on  a 
monthly  return  from  the beneficiary enterprise 
verified on  the  basic  of  stock  accounts  and  spot 
checks.  There  is  no  way  of  carrying  out  permanent 
physical  inventories  for  such  complicated production 
methods,  which  means  that  controls  are  founded  on - 71  -
the  manufacturer's  own  records. 
In  one  Member  State, there  are  no  control  problems 
because  the  production  cycle  is  under  permanent 
supervision  for  domestic  taxation purposes.  Super-
vision  is even  easier  in that particular  country 
since the  use  of  products  which  have  already  re-
ceived a  refund  in order  to produce  isoglucose  is 
prohibited. 
B)  Difficulties  in  connection  with  quality  control  and 
control  of  actual  use 
In  addition to the difficulties described,  there 
are difficulties arising  in  connection  with  the qua-
lity control  and  control of  actual  use  of groats,  meal 
and  quellmehl. 
1.  Quality  control 
For  practical  reasons,  the  quality of all the 
quantities of  the  product  obtained cannot  be
1veri-
fied  systematically  and  in these  cases  samples  are 
taken,  ensuring  compliance  with  quality  requi-
rements  only  in  respect  of  those quantities  from 
which  samples  have  been  taken  for  analysis. 
In  some  Member  States,  however,  each  consignment 
is  analysed  ;  in  another  Member  State the official 
agency  responsible  for  inspection analyses  the 
samples  drawn  by  the brewery  itself when  it verifies - 72  -
processing  in this  firm. 
2.  Control  of actual  use 
As  for  checks  of  actual  use,  they  not  only  require 
the  establishment  of  extensive  facilities~ but  are 
also  hampered  by  serious  Legal  and  administrative 
problems  where  there  is deltvery to the  brewery  of 
another  Member  State,  5ince the  inspectors  a~tho­
rized  in  one  Member  State are  not  empowered  to  check 
on  nationals of other  countries. 
The  Committee  has  also  been  informed  that  in at 
Least  one  Member  State verification of the  actual 
use  of groats  and  meal  in breweries  is  hampered 
by  major  practical difficulties because  of the 
large  number  of breweries  scattered throughout  the 
country  and  also  by  a  Legal  problem,  since the 
brewers  themselves  are  not  direct  beneficiaries of 
aid. 
In  another  Member  State, where  beer  production  and 
the  corresponding  raw  materials are  under  constant 
supervision  for  tax  purposes,  these  control diffi-
dulties do  not  arise. 
3.  Recovery  of  aid 
In  addition  to  the  control difficulties mentioned 
aboven  the  possibility of effective redress  where 
the  product  is not  used  in  accordance  with  the  aid 
objectives  is  disputed  in  certain Member  States. - 73  -
In  practice,  the  problem  arises  in  cases  where  the 
product  has  been  sold to  its final  purchaser  and  the 
security guaranteeing  the  processing  and  destina-
tion  has  been  accordingly  released. 
Should  the  product  then  be  used  for  other  purposes, 
the  aid  unduly  paid  cannot  always  be  recovered  : 
- it  cannot  be  recovered  from  the  final  user  (bre-
wery)  because  he  did  not  receive the  aid directly 
and  has  no  commitment  towards  the  intervention 
agency  ; 
- it  can  hardly  be  recovered  from  the direct  bene-
ficiary  of  the aid because  the  fulfilled all  his 
obligations  by  selling  the  product  to  a  brewery 
and  does  not  seem  legally  responsible  for  a  misuse 
of  which  he  is not  the  author,  unless  he  can  be 
held  financially  responsible.  In  a  case  similar  to 
this,  except  that  there  was  a  clause  providing 
for  proper  use  of  the product  - butter  for  pas-
trymaking  (1)  - the  European  Court  reasoned  that 
the  responsibility of the  aid beneficiary  should 
extend  as  far  as  a  use  of  the  product  which  was 
in  accordance  with  the objectives of  the  aid 
scheme.  It  ruled that  the  security  lodged  by  the 
successful  tenderer  for  the  butter  should not  be 
released until  the  butter  is processed  and  used 
by  the  final  user  in  accordance  with official 
stipulations. 
This  reasoning  could  be  applied to the  case  consi~ 
dered  here,  where  the  security  is  released. 
(1)  Cases  99/75  and  100/76 - Reports  of  Cases  before  the 
Court  1977,  p.  861 - 74  -
However,  the  Committee  feels that  the  safest  so-
lution  would  be  to  include  in  the  Communjty  rules 
either  a  clause  making  the  beneficiary responsi-
ble  for  the  use  of  the  product,  even  after  release 
of  the security  ;  or  one  obliging  the beneficiary 
to  include  a  clause  in  the  contract  whereby  the 
responsibility  for  use  would  devolve,  where 
applicable,  on  successive  purchasers. 
SECTION  III  - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A)  The  production  refund  system 
The  Committee  appreciates  the difficulties of  ap-
plying  the production  refund  system  and  the  divergencies 
of  interpretation of  the  rules  between  the  Member 
States, the  result of  which  is that  the operators  are 
threated differently.  The  Committee  considers  this  is 
mainly  because  the  rules  are  not  clear and  because 
certain  requirements  governing  the granting  of  the 
refund  are  difficult  or  impossible to  apply  in practice. 
Technically  speaking  - without  speculating  as  to  the 
economic  impact  of  such  a  change  in  the  present  sy.stem-
the  Committee  believes that  a  return to  the  system  of 
paying  the  refund  a  posteriori  against  proof of the 
quantities of  products  effectively processed  (system 
applied  in  some  Member  States until  1968  and  even  1974) 
could  well  overcome  most  of  the  present  difficulties. - 75  -
B)  Recasting of the  rules 
If the  advance  payment  system  is  maintained,  the 
Committee  feels  that  the  present  rules  must ·be  comple-
tely recast.  In  the first place,  they  sould  Lay  down 
quality criteria to  be  fulfilled by  the basis  product 
in  order  to be  eligible for  aid and  also give  a  clear 
definition of  what  is meant  by  term "processing"  ; 
the  Committee  also  suggests  considering  a  solution 
similar to  the  one  adopted  for oil  seeds,  where 
advances  are  paid  on  the basic  products  by  reference 
to the  standard quality. 
The  rules  should also  spell out  the details  for 
placing  goods  under  supervision  to ensure  effective 
control of  the  processing  stage  and  should  amend 
the  control  arrangements  to  cope  with  continuous 
processing  because  control  of  individual  consignments 
is  not  feasible. 
The  Committee  recommends  applying  to the basic product 
the  rate  valid at  the  time  of  entry  into  supervision 
to  avoid  the discrepancies  which  would  inevitably 
arise  if rates  are  changed  during  the  processing  stage. 
However,  if this  were  done,  steps  should  be  taken  to 
forestall  speculation at  the  time  of  the  change,  by 
suspending  acceptance  for  supervision  a  few  days 
previously. - 76  -: 
C)  Penalties  for  improper  practice 
The  Committee  finds  that  the  arrangements  for 
controlling final  use  of  processed products "differ 
considerably  from  one  Member  State to  another  ;  it 
also  finds  that  in  some  Member  States  legal  problems 
hamper  the penalization of  improper  use,  and  in  such 
cases the  recovery of aid paid.  It  recommends  amending 
the  rules either to provide  in all  cases - even  after 
release of  the  security - for  the  recovery of  the aid 
from  the  recipient  where  the  use  to  which  the products 
are  actually put  does  not  comply  with  the  rules,  or to 
stipulate that  a  clause  must  be  included  in sales 
contracts  to  the effect  that  responsibility would 
devolve  on  successive purchasers.  In  the  Committee's 
view,  the  only  way  of  safeguarding  Community  funds 
against  improper  use  of  the  finished product  by  one  ..... 
of  users  is to adopt  one  or  another  of  these solutions. - 77  -
CHAPTER  VI 
AID  FOR  DURUM  WHEAT 
The  annual  cost  of  this policy  averaged  98  m EUA  between 
1973  and  1978;  variations  around  the  average  were  slight despite 
a  change  in  the  method  of  allocation  in  1976.  Apparent  fluc-
tuations  are  mainly  due  to  variations  in.payment  deadlines  (see 
table  on  page  26). 
SECTION  I  - RULES 
Before  the  change  in  1976177  (1)  aid  was  granted  on  the 
basis of  quanti~ produced  and  was  given  for  all durum  wheat 
harvested  in  the  Community.  This  was  unsatisfactory on  seve-
rat  counts.  As  the  aid  was  given  for  the  quantity  produced, 
with  no  reference  to quality,  increased production  was  en-
couraged  to  the  detriment  of  quality.  Farmers  producing  large 
quantities  who  already  obtained  an  adequate  income  from  their 
wheat  received  aid,  but  the  amount  was  an  insufficient  incen-
tive to produce  wheat  in  areas  where  the  yield  was  low.  In 
addition,  in  areas  where  a  large  proportion of  the  harvest  was 
consumed  on  the  farm  checking  the  quantity  harvested  was  dif-
ficult. 
(1)  Council  Regulation  (EEC>  No  1143/76- OJ  L 130  of 
19.5.1976 - 78  -
This  arrangement  was  replaced  by  a  more  selective one,  the  new 
rules  being 
aid given  on  the  basis of  the  area  sown  and  harvested; 
- aid  restricted to  certain production  zones;. 
- the  wheat  to  have  certain qualitative and  technical  charac-
teristics guaranteeing its suitability for  milling  and  pro-
cessing  into pasta.  More  precisely,  Commission  Regulation 
No  2835/77  stipulates that  it must  either  : 
•  be  of  a  quality  such  that  the  pasta  made  from  it  is not 
sticky  when  cooked  or 
•  have  been  grown  from  seeds  of  certain varieties that  the 
Member  States can  be  sure  are  of  this quality. 
The  new  system  was  also  intended to  speed  up  calculation 
and  payment  of  the  aid. 
The  rules  stipulate that  producers  must  submit  an  ap-
plication not  Later  than  30  April  each  year  for  the  coming 
marketing  year  C1  August  - 31  July).  The  area  sown,  chdastral 
reference  and  seed  variety must  be  indicated. 
Member  States are  required to  check  the  accuracy  of  at 
Least  5 X of  the  applications  and,  more  generally,  to ensure 
that  the  product  for  which  aid  is  requested  meets  the  condi-
tions  Laid  down. - 79  -
SECTION  II  - APPLICATION  AND  CHECKING  DIFFICULTIES 
A)  Delays  in  adoption  of  regulations  for  individual  years 
Delays  in the  Council's  approval  of  the  year's  prices  affect 
durum  wheat  production  more  seriously than  production  of  any 
other  cereals  because  producers  do  not  know  how  much  aid  they 
can  expect,  if any,  which  areas  will  qualify  and  what  quality 
requirements  will  be  Laid  down. 
The  geographical  areas  for  which  aid  is given  and  the  quality 
characteristics  have  been  constantly  changed  since  1976. 
This  has  caused  a  number  of  practical difficulties.  In  one 
Member  State,  except  for  1979/80,  producers  were  unable  to 
Lodge  their  application  until  after  the  harvest,  making  any 
on-the-spot  check  of  areas  sown  and  the  quality  of  the  wheat 
harvested  impossible. 
B)  Checks 
Production  and  marketing  conditions  for  durum  wheat  vary 
markedly  from  one  production  area  to  another  and  the diffi-
culties  involved  in  making  adequate  checks  vary  accordingly. 
1.  Checks  on  quantities 
Before  1976/77  aid  was  given  in  respect  of  the  quantities 
produced  in  the  Community.  In  France  there  were  no  spe-
cial difficulties  here  as  practically all production  is 
marketed  and  the  collectors'  accounts  show  the  quantities 
received  from  the  individual  suppliers. - 80  -
. 
In  Italy,  on  the  other  hand,  the  same  checking  methods 
could  not  be  applied because  of  the  scale  of  farmers'  own 
consumption  and  the  fact  that  the  quantities  actually 
collected are  not  properly  known.  The  department  respon-
sible  for  paying  the  aid  consequently  made  its checks 
from  the  statements  of  areas  sown  and  quantities produced, 
these  being  compared  with  average  yields  recorded  for 
each  small  production  zone.  This  method  carried the  risk 
that,  in  the  calculation of  eligible quantities,  any 
error  in  yield  might  combine  with  errors  as  to  areas 
sown. 
2.  Checks  on  areas  sown 
From  1976/77 onwards  aid  in  respect  of  quantities pro-
duced  was  replaced  by  aid  in  respect  of  areas  sown  and 
harvested. 
In  France,  this  meant  a  deterioration  in  the  position. 
Before  1979/80 it was  not  possible to  implement  any 
system  of  direct  checks  on  areas  sown  before  the  harvest. 
The  post-harvest  check  consisted  in  comparing  by  computer 
the  areas  declared  by  the  producers  for  the  year  in question 
and  those  under  durum  wheat  in the previous  three years, 
calculated  from  the  quantities  harvested  and  collected 
and  the  average  yields  for  each  year. 
Producers  who  had  declared  areas  markedly  higher  than 
the  "theoretical" areas  cultivated previously  were  picked 
out  by  the  computer  for  more  thorough  checking. - 81  -
This  check  consisted  in  commaring  the  areas  declared  with 
the  quantity  already  delivered to the  collectors  or  still 
in  store  on  the  farm.  If  a  discrepancy  was  revealed  the 
declaration  was  automatically  adjusted by  the  intervention 
agency. 
This  method  of  selection for  checking  cannot  be  considered 
entirely satisfactory.  Only  those  producers  whose  area 
declarations  are  markedly  higher  than  the  areas  previously 
under  durum  wheat  are  picked  out  by  the  computer.  Pro-
ducers  whose  declarations  are  comparable  to those  of 
previous  years  are  in practice not  checked  in  any  way. 
This  is particularly  worrying  as  total  areas  devoted  to 
durum  wheat  in  France  are  declining.  The  agency  responsi-
ble  for  administering  the  aid does  however  check  that  the 
aggregate  area declared  corresponds  to that  estimated sta-
tistically by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture. 
However,  since  applications  for  aid  for  1979/80  were 
lodged  before  30  April,  on-the-spot  checks  could  be  car-
ried  out  before  the  harvest  in  order  to  ascertain the 
areas  sown  and  to establish  whether  the  varieties decla-
red  matched  those  actually grown. 
In  Italy,  a  computer  is used  to  compare  the  areas  de-
clared  with  those  declared  in  previous  years.  Anomalous 
declarations  are  thoroughly  checked  out.  A random  se-
lection  is  made  from  the  other  declarations  for  veri-
fication. - 82  -
The  areas  declared  by  the  producer  are  checked  before 
the  harvest  by  direct  measurement  and  by  comparison  with 
the  cadastral  information  annexed  to  the  application. 
Although  no  instances  of  fraud  have  been  found  since  the 
new  system  began  the  number  of  applications  involved pre-
sents  problems. 
In  certain  regions  of  the  two  Member  States  concerned 
the  areas  sown  vary  from  year  to  year  for  both  technical 
(rotation of  crops)  and  economic  reasons  (profit  on  durum 
wheat  compared  with  other  crops).  The  results  of  a  check-
ing  exercise  are  not  therefore  valid for  the  following 
years. 
In  practice,  on-the-spot  checks  can  be  made  only  during 
a  fairly  short  period of  about  two  months  before  harvest-
ing  and  a  large  number  of  stafr  is  required. 
Areas  cannot  always  be  assessed  from  the  cadastral  re-
gister, as  areas  under  durum  wheat  are  merely  classified 
as  arable  land.  A single plot  may  be  used  for  several 
crops  simult;neously.  In  such  cases  direct  measurement 
is the  only  answer. 
Lastly  and  most  important,  penalties  are  inadequate.  An 
incorrect  declaration  can  result  in  a  penalty  only  if 
fraudulent  intent  is proven,  which  is  very difficult  to 
do  in practice.  One  of  the  Member  States  concerned  has 
prepared  a  draft  law  under  which  detection  of  an  irregu-
larity  would  automatically entail  an  administrative 
penalty. - 83  -
3.  Checks  on  quality 
a)  Ambiguities  in the  rules 
Under  the  old  system  the only qyality  condition  was 
compatibility  with  the  intervention criteria.  Under 
the  present  rules,  for  aid to be  granted  two  quality 
conditions  must  be  met.  The  durum  wheat  must  either 
-present  qualitative  and  technical  characteristics 
indicating that  pasta  made  from  it  will  not  be  sticky 
when  cooked;  or 
- have  been  produced  from  seed  of  certain varieties that 
the  Member  States  can  be  sure  present  these  characte-
ristics. 
The  Community  rules  make  "not  sticky  when  cooked"  the 
only quality  criterion  and  allow  technical  control  to 
be  waived  for  stable  varieties of  Long  standing  which 
are  known  to possess  this  characteristic.  The  new 
high-yield  varieties  are  not  excluded  but  a  check  must 
be  carried out  in  every  case. 
The  lack  of  a  Community  list of  varieties qualifying 
for  aid  and  of  a  Community  pasta-making test  makes 
ambiguous  interpretations  possible,  particularly where 
the  new  varieties  are  concerned.  The  "not  sticky 
when  cooked"  rule,  which  it  is  Left  to  the  Member 
States  to  interpret,  is  also  imprecise. - 84  -
b)  Checking  methods 
In  Italy a  list of  varieties qualifying  for  aid  has 
been  adopted.  Producers  are  obliged to indicate  in 
their  applications  both  the  area  sown  and  the  va-
rieties used  and  the  variety  check  is made  on  the  spot 
during  the growing  period at  the  same  time  as  the 
check  ori  area  sown.  Determination  of the variety du-
ring  the  growing  period  is  relatively quick  and  easy 
and  a  false  declaration  can  be  more  adequately penalized 
as  fraudulent  intent  is easier to prove. 
In  France  no  list of eligible varieties  has  been  a-
dopted  nor  is  any  pasta-making  test  used  in  the  checks. 
Quality  control  in  France  poses  special difficulties: 
- up  to  1979/80,  on-the-spot  checking  of  the varieties 
grown  had  to  be  ruled  out  as  the  producers  made  their 
declarations  after the  harvest  - for  the  reasons 
already  indicated; 
- checks  on  variety or  pasta-making  quality  at  the 
moment  of  collection  would  hardly  be  realistic  in 
view  of  the  numbers  of  producers  and  collectors  and 
the  cost  of  the  analyses.  In  addition,  as  regards 
pasta-making  quality,  the  liability under  criminal 
law  of  a  particular producer  could  not  be  established 
since  the  quality  may  depend  on  weather  conditions 
affecting  the  whole  harvest.  All  the producers  would 
therefore  have  to  be  checked  and  this  is not  practic-
able; - 85  -
- a  check  on  variety or  pasta-making quality after 
entry  into  the  collectors'  stores  would  be  easier 
but  the  major  difficulty  would  then  be  that  non-
eligible batches  could  not  be  attributed to  indi-
vidual  producers. 
In  practice the  intervention  agency  responsible  for  the 
adMinistration of  the  aid  has  made  the  quality  checks 
by  verifying that  the  wheat  collected  was  in  fact  sold 
to  meal  factories  by  the  collectors. 
This  approach  is  not  entirely satisfactory  : 
- the  fact  that  batches  of  wheat  are  sold  to meal 
factories  does  not  guarantee  their  intrinsic quality, 
as  the  meal  manufacturers  buy  on  the  basis  of  the 
market  prices  for  the  different  varieties  and  mix 
their  purchases  together; 
- at  the  time  of  the  checks  part  of  the  wheat  c6l-
lected  will  not  have  been  resold  and  its final 
destination  will  not  be  known; 
- lastly and  most  important,  if it emerged  from  the 
checks  that  certain batches  had  a  final  destination 
other  than  milling this  would  have  no  practical ef-
fect  as  it would  not  be  possible to determine  the 
producers  from  which  they  came. 
SECTION  III  - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A)  Restrictions  on  aid 
The  Committee  finds  that  there  are  considerable  management 
and  control  difficulties with  regard to aid for  durum  wheat 
although  it  appreciates  the  social  and  economic  importance 
of  maintaining  production of  durum  wheat  in  certain  regions 
of the  Community. - 86  -
. 
In  view  of  the difficulties, it thinks  that  aid  should per-
haps  be  limited to those  regions  where  because  of  natural 
conditions  yields  are  Low  and  the  possibility of  changing 
to other  crops  very  Limited. 
8)  Aid  arrangements 
Because  of  the  different  conditions  obtaining in  Italy and 
France,  the  aid  systems  based  on  quantity produced  or  on 
area  sown  may  both  present  drawbacks  in one  country  or  the 
other.  The  Committee  feels that, despite  the  inevitable 
difficulties  in  calculating equivalence  between  the  two 
rates if aid, this  situation  could  perhaps  be  taken  into 
acco~nt  by  specifying  in the  Community  rules that  a  choice 
may  be  made  for  each  region between  granting  aid  in  respect 
of  area  sown  and  granting  it  in  respect  of quantity produ-
ced. 
c>  Control  arrangements 
1.  Checks  on  area  sown 
If the  solution outlined  in  8  is  not  adopted  and  the 
system  of  aid based  on  area  sown  is  maintain~d throughout 
the  Community,  the  Committee  recommends  that  direct  area 
checks  be  instituted  in  all  aided  regions. 
2.  Checks  on  quality 
The  Committee  notes  that  an  attempt  is being  made  to 
devise  a  Community  pasta-making test  and  wishes  to see this 
introduced  rapidly.  It  recommends  that  as  soon  as  the 
test  is  ready  a  list of  the  varieties qualifying  for  aid 
be  drawn  up,  valid  for  the  whole  Community. - 87  -
The  Committee  found  that  checking  quality  at  the  moment  of 
collection was  impracticable,  that  checking  by  analysis  the 
stocks  held  by  collectors did  not  permit  the origin of  de-
fective  batches to be  identified,  that  checks  on  the  final 
destination of  the  wheat  - meal  factories - presented the 
same  disadvantage  and  that  further  it was  impossible  to 
strictLy equate  purchase  by  meal  factori,es  with  suitability 
for  pasta  manufacture. 
The  Committee  concludes  that  if the  quality  requirements  are 
retained the  only  possible  checking  method  will  be  on-the-
spot  checks  during  the  growing  period.  It  is only  the  va-
rieties grown  that  can  be  checked  in this  way  and  a  Commu-
nity  List  of  eligible varieties  will first  have  to  be  adop-
ted. 
3.  Penalties 
The  Committee  would  recommend  that  all  Member  States 
institute  a  system  of  sanctions  that  allows  for  the  pe-
nalising  of  incorrect  declarations  without  any  reference 
to  an  intent  to defraud. 
D)  Date  of publication of  the  regulations 
The  Committee  finds  that  the  main  particulars of  the  aid 
arrangement,  i.e. the  regions  covered  and  the quality 
characteristics  required,  are  known  too  late  for  producers 
to be  able  to  make  an  economic  choice  in full  awareness  of 
the  terms  on  which  aid  will  be  available. 
It  recommends,  therefore,  that  the  rules  on  aid should  be 
made  known  to farmers  a  reasonable  time  in  advance  and  even 
adopted  to  cover  more  than  a  single  year. - 88  -
CHAPTER  VII 
INTRA-COMMUNITY  TRADE  AND  MONETARY 
COMPENSATORY  AMOUNTS 
The  onli figure  available  for  expenditure  on 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  is an  aggregate  one  for all 
the  sectors  financed  from  the  FEOGA  Guarantee  Fund.  The  total 
amounts  in million  EUA  1  have  been  as  follows  since  1973: 
1973  133.4 
1974  153.5 
1975  335.6 
1976  438.2 
1977  989.2 
1978  880.3 
These  figures  are  the  balance  of  MCAs  granted 
and  levied  in  intra-Community  trade  and  MCAs  granted  in 
trade  with  non-Community  countries.  MCAs  levied  on  trade 
with  non-Community  countries  accrue to the  Community  as 
"own  resources".  The  amount  of  880.3 million  EUA  for  1978 
thus  breaks  down  as  follows 
1  Figures  converted  into  EUA  to facilitate  comparison. - 89  -
Intra-Community  trade 
Balance  of  MCAs  granted/levied  on 
importation  (payments  exceeded  charges) 
Balance  of  MCAs  granted/levied  on 
exportation  (charges  exceeded  payments) 
Net  expenditure 
External  trade 
MtAs  granted  on  exportation 
MCAs  granted  on  importation  not  cancelled 
out  by  levy 
Net  expenditure 
Total  net  expenditure 
mill ion  EUA 
1  109.6 
- 440.3 
669.3 
98.4 
112.6 
211.0 
·880. 3 
Expenditure  on  MCAs  is assessed at  809.2  million 
EUA  for  1979  and  408.1  million  EUA  for  1980.  The  figures 
are  lower  because  the  green  rates  will  diverge  less  from 
the  central  or  market  rates. - 90  -
SECTION  I  - COMMUNITY  RULES 
The  monetary  compensatory  amounts 
As  the  common  agricultural  policy is based  on 
the  principles  of  common  prices and  Community  financing 
of  intervention expenditure  a  common  denominator  for all 
the  Community  currencies  was  chosen  in  the  form  of  the  unit 
of account.  Agricultural  prices were  fixed  in  units of account, 
then  converted  into  the  currency  of  each  Member  State  on  the 
basis of  the relationship between  the  currency and  the  unit 
of account. 
Since  the  launching  of  the  European  mon~tary system 
the  common  prices  have  been  expressed  in  ECU,  the principles 
observed  with  regard to  conversion  remaining  the  same. 
The  dtfficulties of  the  current  situation- with 
currency  values  fluctuating  without  equivalent  modification 
of  their parities - are  surmounted  by  using  monetary  com-
pensatory amounts. 
1.  Background 
a)  Regulations  Nos  653/68  and  1134/68,  issued  in the  context 
of  a  fixed  parity system,  required Member  States which 
changed  the  value  of  their  currencies,  i.e.  declared 
a  new  parity to the  IMF,  to  readjust  their domestic 
prices paid  to producers accordingly. - 91  -
In  theory,  any  Member  State  which  revalued  its currency 
had  to  reduce  prices  in  its national  currency and  any 
Member  State  which  devalued  had  to  increase  them. 
It  turned  out  to  be  impossible to act  so  vigorously 
without  risking  upsetting  the  economy  of  the  country 
concerned.  For  this  reason  in  1969  when  the  French  franc 
was  devalued  (8 August)  monetary  compens~tory amounts 
were  introduced.  It  was  intended that  these  should  be 
phased  out  as  and  when  the price adjustments  had  been 
made,  an  object  achieved  in August  1971. 
b)  In  May  1971  a  number  of  Member  States  switched  to a 
system  of  floating  exchange  rates,  which  led  to the 
adoption  on  12  May  1971  of  Regulation  N°  974/71,  intro-
ducing  a  system  of  variable monetary  compensatory 
amounts. 
c)  This  development  led  to the  introduction of  a  distinction 
between  Member  States  which  had  undertaken  to  restrict 
to 2.25  ~  the  maximum  margin  of  fluctuation  between 
the  rate  for  the  most  appreciated  currency and  that  for  the 
most  depreciated and  those  who  continued to  Let  their 
currencies float  more  freely. 
For  the  first  the monetary  compensatory  amounts  were 
fixed  and  for  the  second  remained  variable.  This  system 
entered  into force  on  4  June  1973  (Regulation  N°  509/73). - 92  -
2.  The  present  situation 
The  launching  of  the  European  monetary  syst~m  (13 March 
1979)  aimed  at  stabilizing the Member  States'  currency 
exchange  rates  has  permitted an  increase  in  the  number 
of Member  States  committing  themselves  to  limit to 
2.25  X the maximum  margin  of  fluctuation  between  the 
rate  for  the most  appreciated  currency and  that  for  the 
most' depreciated. 
Only  Italy and  the United  Kingdom  apply variable MCAs. 
Denmark  and  Ireland do  not  apply any.  The  Belgo-Luxembourg 
Union  (BLEU>  and  the  Netherlands,  which  have  decided 
to maintain  between  their  currencies the margins  of 
fluctuation applying  in May  1971,  do  not  apply MCAs 
between  themselves and  are  considered a  single Member 
State  for  the  purposes of  the application of  the MCA 
system  in  their  trade  with  other  Member  States and  non• 
Community  countries.  These  MCAs  are  fixed,  as are those 
charged/paid  by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and 
France. 
3.  Operational  principle 
Under  Council  Regulation  n°  974/71  1  a  Member  State the 
currency of  which  has  appreciated  with  respect  to its 
"green"  rate  <conversion  rate used  for  implementation 
of  CAP)  levies MCAs  on  imports  and  grants  .. them  on 
exports  in trade  with  Member  States and  non-Community 
countries.  Conversely  a  Member  State the  currency of 
1 
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which  has  depreciated vis-a-vis  its green  rate  levies 
MCAs  on  exports  and  grants  them  on  imports. 
4.  Calculation  of  MCAs 
MCAs  are  calculated only  in national  currencies.  For  cereals 
they are  the difference  between  the  intervention price 
calculated  using  the  conversion  rate  used  for  the  CAP  and 
the  same  intervention price  calculated using  either the  central 
rate  (for  currencies tied  to the  2.25  % rule)  or  a  weekly 
average  of  market  rates  (for  currencies floating  freely). 
5.  Detailed  rules  for  granting and  levying  MCAs 
Under  Article  8  of  Commission  Regulation  n°  1380/75  laying 
down  detailed  rules for  the application of monetary  compen-
satory amounts,  payment  of  the amount  is, as  with  payment 
of  a  refund,  dependent  on  production  of  certain evidence, 
in  the  case  of  exports  evidence  that  the goods  have  left  the 
geographical  territory of  the Member  State and  in  the  case 
of  imports  evidence  that  the  import  customs  formalities 
have  been  completed  and  where  appropriate  that  the goods 
have  been  used  for  the  purposes  specified. 
The  MCA  is paid  only  on  receipt  of  a  written application 
from  the  person  concerned  which  must,  except  in  cases  of 
force  majeure,  be  submitted  within  six months  from  the - 94  -
date  of  clearance  through  customs  for  export  or  import. 
Payment  is normally made  within  two  months  from  the 
day  of  receipt  of all the  relevant  documents. 
In  the  case  of  MCAs  levied  the amount  is due  for  payment 
on  the  completion  of  customs  formalities  eit~er on 
export  or  import.  Since  1  January  1979  payment  may  be 
deferred at  the  request  of  the  person  concerned  provided 
that  he  complies  with  the  procedures  laid down  in  the 
Directive  on  the  postponement  of  the  payment  of  import 
or  export  duties 
1  • 
6.  Payment  on  behalf  of another Member  State 
Under  Article  2(a)  of  Regulation  N°  974/71  when  a  product 
is exported  from  one  Member  State to another  which  will 
be  obliged to grant  an  MCA  for  it the exporting Member 
State may  in agreement  with  the  importing  Member  State 
pay  the MCA.  In  such  cases  no  MCA  is granted  by  the 
importing  Member  State  on  goods  from  the exporting 
Member  State  in question. 
At  present  this arrangement  applies to : 
- products  imported  into the United  Kingdom  from  a 
Member  State  other  than  Italy; 
- products  imported  into  Italy from  other Member  States. 
1 
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SECTION  II  - OPERATIONAL  DIFFICULTIES  OF  COMMUNITY  TRANSIT 
SYSTEM 
A)  Outline  of  system 
Goods  in free  circulation within  the  Community 
(both  goods  originating  in  the  Community  and  goods  from 
non-member  countries admitted to free  circulation)  circulate 
under  the  internal  Community  transit  procedure  (Document 
T2). 
Three  copies of  these documents  accompany  the goods 
from  the  office  of  departure  to the office of destination, 
which  returns  copy  N°3  to the office of departure  to permit 
the  clearance  of  the  Community  transit  operation. 
Moreover,  if the  exporting  Member  State  is paying 
the  MCA  on  behalf  of  an  importing  Member  State, the goods 
must  also be  accompanied  by  a  T5  control  copy,  as well 
as  the  T2,  giving  the necessary  information  for  calculating 
the  MCAs  and  bearing a  special  stamp  showing  that  the goods 
are  intended to be  released for  consumption  in  the Member 
State  of destination.  After the goods  have  been  released 
for  consumption,  this  copy,  bearing  a  special  stamp,  is 
returned  to the Member  State of  export  (office  of 
departure  or  central agency)  to permit  payment  of  the MCA. - 96  -
8)  Date  of  stamping  of  TSs 
In  two  Member  States customs  legislation allows, 
for  intra-Community  trade,  import  declarations to be 
submitted  four  days  before  the anticipated arrival of 
the goods.  Delays  of  a  month  have,  however,  o~curred 
between  this declaration of  intention and  the actual 
importation.  As  a  result  certain TSs  stamped  by  the 
importing Member  State  carry an  import  date  before  the 
date  of  departure  of  the goods. 
In  this  connection the Court  of  Justice of  the 
European  Community  ruled  in  its judgment  in  Case  113/78, 
given  on  21  February  1979,  that 
"the'day of  importation'within the  ~eaning of  Article  15  (1) 
of  Regulation  N°  120/67  of  the Council  of  13  June  1967 
(basic  cereals  regulation  replaced  by  Council  Regulation 
N°  2727/75  of  29  October  1975  1>  cannot  be  earlier than 
that  on  which  the goods  were  brought  to a  place designated 
by  the  competent  national  authorities to enable  them  to· 
make  a  real and  effective  customs  inspection of  the goods". 
The  Committee  takes  the  view  that  the  TS  documents 
should  never  be  stamped  before the goods  have  been  cleared 
through  customs  for  consumption. 
C)  Change  of  entries on  form  after  return  of  TS 
The  Committee  has  also noticed  cases  in  which 
1 
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entries on  the  TS  - stamped  and  returned  by  the  customs 
service  of  the  importing  Member  State -were incorrect. 
In  particular, the  quantities noted  on  the  document 
were  not  those  recorded  on  unloading.  Discrepancies  were, 
however,  reported  to the  customs  of  the Member  States of 
origin  only after a  lapse  of  several months  by  the  despatch 
of  a  discrepancy  report.  In  some  cases,  information  had 
not  been  passed  on  to the  paying  departments,  so  that  sums 
wrongly  paid  out  were  not  recovered. 
D)  Procedures 
More  generally,  the  Committee  has  noted that  in 
isolated  cases  certain  customs  officers  in  the Member 
States  have  not  familiarized  themselves  completely  with 
Community  transit  procedures.  One  aim  of the establishment 
of  T1,T2,T2L  and  T3L  transit documents- accompanying 
the  goods  - has  been  to provide  for  the  successive  customs 
offices through  which  the  goods  transit the  same  information 
on  the  nature  and  the  customs  status of  the  goods  so as 
to enable them  to adopt  the  same  attitude  with  regard  to 
these goods.  The  Committee  has  noted at  least  one  case  -
see  Annex  II  to this report,  Case  N°  6  - in  which  the transit 
documents  of  two  Member  States  led  the  respective  customs 
to adopt  conflicting positions  with  regard  to the  same 
operation. - 98  -
E)  Incorrectly  completed  forms 
The  Commission  has  discovered  that  in  certain 
cases 
- entries that  should  have  been  made  on  the  ~ontrol copy 
are  lacking  or  are  incorrect  or  incomplete; 
- the  control  copy  bears entries and  annotations not 
provided  for  in  the  Community  rules.  As  these entries 
and  annotations are  in another  language  they are  likely 
to  hold  up  release  for  consumption  as the  customs  office 
quite  rightly insists on  their being  translated; 
- an  imprecise entry is made  by  the  customs  office of 
release  for  consumption  in  the "Control as  to  use  and/ 
or destination"  box  of  the  control  copy.  This  may  mislead 
the paying  agency  if the particular entry specified in  the 
Community  r~les is missing. 
F)  Other  anomalies  in  the  use  of  the  TS  control  copy 
The  Commission  has  found  that  in  certain  cases 
- the  control  copy,  although  indicated on  the Community 
transit  document  accompanying  the goods,  was  not  presented 
when  the  customs  formalities  for  release for  consumption 
were  carried out; - 99  -
- a  second  control  copy  issued  for  national  purposes 
accompanied  the goods  to the  customs  office of  release 
for  consumption,  this office  being  confronted  with 
two  control  copies  for  the  same  goods; 
- a  single  control  copy  was  used  to  serve as evidence  for 
more  than  one  operation,  i.e.  releas~ for  consumption 
and  processing  of  the  goods.  When  a  particular proces-
sing  operation  is prescribed the  operator  concerned 
is usually allowed  six months  to  carry it out,  which 
delays  return  of  the  control  copy  as  it  cannot  be 
stamped  until the  processing  has  taken  place; 
- a  control  copy  was  issued  for  goods  to which  no  MCAs 
applied; 
- goods  intended to pass  through a Member  State  were 
released  for  consumption  there  in  the absence  of  the 
control  copy,  which  had  not  been  issued at the office 
of  departure. 
G)  Procedures  used  for  release  for  consumption  and  return 
of  control  copy 
It  has  also  been  confirmed  that there  is no 
uniform  procedure  for  the  release  for  consumption  of 
goods  covered  by  a  control  copy.  The  Commission  found 
three  different  practic~ in  use  at the  customs  offices 
visited  : - 100  -
- the declaration for  release  for  consumption  bears a 
reference to the  control  copy  (number,  date and  issuing 
office); 
- a  photocopy  of  the  control  copy  is attached to the 
declaration  for  release  for  consumption; 
- the declaration for  release  for  consumption  bears no 
reference to presentation of  the  control  copy. 
Three  practices for  return  of  control  copies  to the 
issuing  Member  State  were  also found  : 
- they are  simply  handed  to the  declaring operator; 
- they are  sent  once  a  week  after particulars of  each 
have  been  recorded; 
- they are  sent  at  roughly  regular  intervals. 
SECTION  Ill - IRREGULARITIES  (see  Annex  II) 
A)  Incorrect  declaration  of  tariff  heading  (see  Case  N°14 
in  Annex  Ill) 
Operators  have  been  known  to declare  the  wrong 
tariff heading  in  order  to achieve a  more  favourable 
MCA  rate.  Thus,  bread  flour  has  been  declared as 
in1ants 1  food  or  food  for dietetic or  culinary - 101  -
use,  or  as manioc  flour.  Irregularities of  this 
kind  have  been  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  the  products 
concerned  Look  much  the  same  and  can  be  properly 
distinguished  only  by  Laboratory analysis. 
Sometimes  not  even  laboratory analysis allows 
the  origin  of  a  product  to  be  determined.  Starch 
may  easily  be  detected,  but  its origin  (wheat  or 
manioc)  is difficult to establish,  especially if 
there  has  been  hydrothermal  processing. 
B)  Smuggling  <see  Case  N°7) 
A Lorry  containing  sacks  of  barley  crossed the 
frontier  between  two  Member  States, and  MCAs  were 
granted.  If  then  slipped  back  to  the Member  State 
of  departure,  avoiding  the  levying  of  MCAs,  and 
appeared  once  more  at  the frontier  to  receive the 
MCAs  a  second  time. 
Fortunately,  no  MCAs  were  granted on  the  second 
presentation to  customs,  as  the  irregularity was 
discovered  in  time. 
C)  Mixing  of  feeding  stuffs  in  order  to gualify for  MCAs 
<see  Case  N°  11) 
Uncertainties as  to  the  right tariff classification 
may  tempt  a  firm,  where  the difference  between  MCAs  is 
Larger  than  the  cost  of  products added  and  additional 
processing,  to mix  products  regardless  of  commercial - 102  -
considerations, merely  in  order to qualify  for  a  more 
favourable  MCA.  This  can  cost  the  Community  a  lot  of 
money. 
Thus  there  has  been  a  case  of  exports  of  foodstuffs 
of  an  unusual  composition  qualifying  for  a  high  MCA  rate. 
When  the  legislation  was  adjusted  to eliminate  the 
incentive,  exports  of  the product  dropped  at once. 
The  operator  sued  for  damages  as  he  had  been  unable 
to  complete  his  contract, but  his  suit  was  rejected  by 
the  Court  of  Justice  1 
In  another  operation of  this nature  the operator 
needed  merely  to add  a  certain proportion  of a  very 
cheap  product  to another  in  order  to qualify for  a 
higher  rate  of  MCA. 
D)  Rule  of  equity  (see  Case  N°  4) 
1 
Where  the  currencies of  the Member  States are  devalued 
or  revalued,  or  the green parities are  changed,  the new 
MCA  rates are  immediately applicable to  intra-Community 
trade operations or  to trade  with  non-member  countries. 
However,  previous  contracts may  qualify  for  the  old 
MCA  rate  if the firm  can  prove  that it would  suffer a 
Loss  if the  new  rates were  applied.  This rule- called 
Case  97/76- Reports  of  Cases  before  the Court,  1977,  p.1063 - 103  -
the  rule  of  equity - was  exploited  by  an  exporter  from 
one  of  the Member  States the  currency of  which  had 
just  been  devalued  to avoid  the  MCA  charge.  This 
firm  had  concluded- before  the devaluation -export 
contracts  with  a  non-member  country and  with  another 
Member  State.  These  contracts  having  been  concluded 
in  the  currency of  the  consignee  countries,  the 
operations  should normally  have  been  subj.ect  to  charging 
of  the  new  MCA.  The  firm  applied  for application of 
the equity  rule, replacing the original  contracts with 
fictive  contracts denominated  in  its national  currency. 
This  case  shows  that the equity  rule entails major 
risks of  fraud,  that  a  very  careful  check  must  be  made 
to ensure  that  the  contracts and  the  loss  suffered are 
genuine,  and  that  the  conditions  under  which  this rule 
can  be  applied must  be  Limited. 
SECTION  IV  - SPECULATION 
A)  Speculative moments  <see  Case  N°  15) 
The  following  case  involved "accession "  compensatory 
amounts  (ACAs).  The  procedures  for  granting  and  levying 
these  amounts  were  similar to those  described above  for 
MCAs. 
In  1975,  when  a  system  of  advanced  fixing  of  ACA 
rates applied  in  the  Community,  it was  observed that 
a  firm  was  operating  between  two  new  Member  States  in 
which  the  ACAs  fixed  in  advance  were  high.  After  being - 104  -
stored for  a  short  time,  the products were  re-exported 
to a  Member  State of  origin  where  the ACA  levied'was much 
Lower. 
At  the  time, the  levelling-off  rule  was  applied 
in  respect  of  ACAs,  stipulating that  ACAs  ch&rged  and 
granted  by  a  Member  State  could  not  exceed  import  charges 
imposed  by  this Member  State  in  respect  of  trade  with 
non-member  countries.  The  result  of  this rule  was  that 
ACA  rates varied  widely  from  one  Member  State to another 
whenever  there  were  wide  variations  on  the  world  market, 
such  as  those  that  occurred  in  1975. 
The  firm  had  applied properly the Community  regulations 
and  taken  advantage  of  the  financial  benefits accruing. 
This  case  is still being  investigated. 
B)  Delays  in  introduction of  MCAs  1  <see  Case  N°17) 
1 
Deflections  of  trade  for  speculative purposes may 
also  be  a  result  of  a  change  in market  conditions. 
Thus  the  MCAs  applying  to trade  in durum  wheat  were 
abolished  in August  1974  because  of  the market  situation. 
This  then  changed  in  such  a  way  that  from  1977  onwards 
several  operators  began  to obtain  regular profits by 
importing  durum  via  one  Member  State and  re-exporting 
it to another. 
In  order  to understand  the  financial  interest of 
these  operations, it should  be  realized that  the  Levy  fixed 
See  Court  of  Auditors'  Report,  p.32,  OJ  N°  C313,  30.12.1978 - 105  -
in  units of  account  does  not  reflect  the actual parities 
after conversion  into the  currencies of  the Member  State. 
Parity  is  restored  by  the application of  an  MCA  and  of 
a  monetary  coefficient  applied to the  import  levy. 
MCAs  on  durum  wheat  were  later  reintroduced by 
the  Commission. 
C)  Normal  trade  flows  inhibited by  MCAs 
In  exceptional  circumstances  it was  considered 
necessary to  send  maize  from  one  Member  State  to another 
for  drying.  The  operation  could  not  take  place  because 
the  difference  in  weight  on  the  return  journey, which 
was  inevitable  because  of  the  loss  of  moisture,  did not 
allow the MCAs  on  the  outward  and  return  journeys to 
be  baLanced. 
The  MCAs  are determined according  to  weight  and 
not  according  to the quality of  the  merchandise.  The 
result  is unwarranted  penalization  whenever  the drying 
is carried out  in a  country whose  currency  has  appreciated. 
Conversely,  firms  in  a  country  whose  currency  has  depre-
ciated may  make  unwarranted gains. 
If such  cases  were  to  recur,  some  kind  of  solution 
would  have  to  be  found  to the  problem. 
SECTION  V - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A)  Improvement  in  the use  of  the  TS  control  copy 
The  Committee  takes  the  view  that  it is of  the greatest - 106  -
importance  that  the  TS  control  copy  be  properly used  as 
it is  in  effect  a  payment  order  for  the  beneficiar.y and 
thus  has  a  direct  impact  on  disbursement  of  funds  under 
the  CAP. 
The  Committee  feels  that  the  rules on  the.subject 
are  so  complex  that  those applying  them  need  special 
training. 
It notes  that  the  Commission  has  undertaken  both 
to  inform  and  to educate  the  relevant  customs  services 
and  private  bustnessmen  involved  in  the execution of 
export  and  transit procedures  so  as  to achieve fuller 
understanding  of  the machinery  for  the  use  of  the  TS 
copy  and  the  financial  role  which  it has. 
The  Committee  recommends 
that operators shall  be  given  sufficient  information 
to facilitate filling  out  the documents; 
- that  the  control  copy  be  returned  only  when  the goods 
have  actually been  inspected  so  as to avoid  recourse 
to the  correction procedure; 
- that  the  same  TS  document  should  not  be  used  for 
different  control  operations  with  regard  to the  same 
goods,  so  as  not  to  lengthen  the  period elapsing 
before  return  of  the document; 
- that  control  copies  should  never  be  sent  back  directly 
1  to the declaring  firm 
1This  point  is considered more  fully  in the  following 
chapter. - 107  -
8)  Tariff  classification and  control difficulties 
The  Committee  takes  the  view  that the trade 
irregularities occuring  are  Largely  a  function  of  the 
tariff classification of  products and  the MCAs  applicable 
to them,  certain very  similar products  being  treated 
very differently as far as MCAs  are  conc~~ned because 
of  the  way  in  which  they  are classified.  The  Committee 
wishes  to stress the  resulting danger  of  speculation 
and  recommends  establishment  of  a  List  of  the products 
in  question  so  that officials responsible for  control 
will  be  aware  of  the  risks to Community  funds  connected 
with  trade  in  them. - 108  -
CHAPTER  VIII 
TRADE  WITH  NON-MEMBER  COUNTRIES 
Cereals  from  non-member  countries  are  subject, on  entry 
into the  Community,  to a  levy  based  on  the difference  between 
the  w~rld market  price  and  the  threshold price.  Conversely, 
for  exports,  the difference  between  the  world  market  price  and 
the  Community  market  price is  covered  by  a "refund"  granted  to 
the exporter. 
Expenditure  on  refunds  (for  basic  cereals  and  first-stage 
processed  products)  accordingly  varies  sharply  as  a  function  of 
world  market  price.  From  1973  to 1978  average  expenditure  was 
423  EUA,  with  a  low  in  1974  (66.5  m EUA)  and  a  high  in  1978 
(831.9  m EUA)  Csee  the  table  on  page  26).  Expenditure  rose 
sharply  in  1978,  and  forecasts  for  1979  point  to a  further  in-
crease  Cto  1  209.4  m EUA). - 109  -
Revenue  from  agricultural  levies  on  all products  (1) 
amount  to the  following  in  m EUA 
1973  438  1976  1.40 
1974  280  1977  1.817 
1975  534  1978  1.873 
1979  1. 706  (budget  forecast) 
Revenue  from  cereals  may  be  estimate~ as  follows,  in  m EUA 
1973  330  1976  790 
1974  140  1977  1.360 
1975  400  1978  1.400 
1979  1. 280  (75X  of  the 
budget  estimate) 
SECTION  I  - SUMMARY  OF  REGULATIONS 
The  detailed  rules  for  determining  levies  and  refunds 
are dealt  with  in  Annex  III  to this  report. 
A)  Imports 
The  threshold price provides  a  reference  for  establishing 
Community  protection  with  regard  to  imports  from  non-member 
countries. 
In  a  normal  period  the  protection  mechanisms  at  the  Community 
frontier  consist  in  a  variable  levy  expressed  in  ECU,  the 
level  of  which  is the difference between  the price cif  (cost, 
insurance,  freight)  and  the  threshold  pri~e. 
(1)  -The Member  States do  not  give  a  breakdown  in  their  returns. 
Estimates  based  on  the  volume  of  imports  from  outside the 
Community  suggest  that  the  cereals  account  for  some  75X 
of total  levy  revenue  (in  normal  years). - 110  -
The  Community  concedes  a  lower  levy  to  certain non-member 
countries  under  bilateral or  multilateral  agree•ents. 
The  levy  for  the  basic products  is  calculated daily. 
8)  Exports 
The  difference  between  world  market  prices, assessed  by  the 
Commission  staff  and  the  Community  prices  may  be  made  up  by 
export  refunds,  so  that  Community  products  coming  under  the 
common  organization of  the  market  in  cereals  can  in  fact  be 
exported. 
1.  Rates 
The  rate of  the  refunds  payable  on  the  various products  is 
studied weekly  and,  if appropriate,  altered by  Commission 
Regulation  adopted  after  consultation of  the Management 
Committee.  There  is a  uniform  rate of  refund  throughout 
the  Community. 
The  rate of  refund  may  vary  according  to the  destination 
or  intended  use  of  the product. 
For  barley  and  common  wheat,  rates  may  be  fixed  by 
tendering  procedure.  Only  a  certain number  of  tenders 
are accepted  by  the Management  Committee  and  tenderers · 
are  required,  if their tender  is accepted,  to export  the 
quantity  specified  in  their tender.  They  receive the 
rates of  refund  which  they  have  proposed  in  their tenders. 
2.  Detailed rules  for  granting  refunds 
Refunds  are  granted  subject  to production  of  two  types  of 
evidence  : 
- evidence  that  the goods  have  actually  left the  Community, 
- in  certain  cases, evidence  of  import  into  a  non-member 
country. - 111  -
a>  Proof  of  export 
Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  n°  192/75  (1)  laying  down 
detailed  rules for  the payment  of  export  refunds  in 
respect  of  agricultural products  requires products 
cleared  through  customs  for  export  have  left  the  Com-
munity  unaltered not  later than  45  days  after  clearan-
ce  (1). 
In  certain special  cases  <supplies  fbr· victualling 
vessels and  aircraft  within  the  Community  and  supplies 
for  international organizations  and  foreign  armed 
forces>  the  product  must  have  reached  its destination 
unaltered  within  45  days. 
A product  may  be  cleared for  export  from  one  Member 
State and  then  cross  Community  territory other  than 
that  of  that  Member  State before  actually  leaving 
the  Community  or  reaching  its destination.  In  this 
case  the  evidence  to be  provided to obtain payment  of 
the  refund  is the  T5  control  copy  (see  Chap.  VII). 
b)  evidence  of  import  into a  non-member  country 
Such  evidence  is  required 
(1)  OJ  NO  L 25,  31.1.1975. 
(2)  - Products  consigned  to territories which,  although  they 
are part  of  the geographical  territory of  a  Member  State, 
are  included  in  the  customs  territory of  a non-member 
country  are  deemed  to  have  left  the  Community;  on  the 
other  hand,  products  sent  to tertitories· which,  although 
they  are  part  of  the  geographical  territory of  a  non-
member  country,  are  included  within  the  Community's  customs 
territory  are  deemed  not  to  have  left  the  Community; 
The  commune  of  Livigno  is deemed  not  to be  part of  the 
geogr~hical territory of  the Community. - 112  -
- when  the  rate of  the  refund  varies  according  to  the 
intended  use  or destination, 
- when  there  is  serious doubt  as  to the  intended  use 
or destination or  the product,  or 
- when  the product  might  be  reintroduced  into the  Com-
munity  because  of  the  difference  between  the  rate 
of  the  refund  on  the  exported product  and  the  import 
charge  applicable to identical products  on  the  day 
of  clearance  for  export. 
SECTIQN  II  - DIFFICULTIES  IN  IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  Supporting  evidence  required  before  refunds  can  be  granted 
Foreign  trade transactions  often  involve  several departments 
and  in particular the  customs  department  in  one  or  more 
different  Member  States as  well  as  the  paying  body  in  one 
Member  State. 
Payment  of  any  refund  is  subject  in  the  first  instance to the 
condition that  the goods  must  actually have  left  the  Commu-
nity. 
The  documents  supporting  the  transactions  carried out  are, 
depending  on  the  case, forwarded  between  the  departments 
concerned  through  administrative  channels  or directly  re-
turned to the operators. 
Two  cases  are  clearly distinguished 
- goods  cleared  for  export  in  one  Member  State  cross  the 
territory of  other  Member  States  before  leaving  the  Com-
munity.  The  proof  of  exit  referred  to  above  is provided 
by  the document,  which  is sent  through  administrative 
channels  by  the  customs  office of exit to the  customs 
office of  departure or  to a  central  body  in  the  Member - 113  -
State of  departure.  Where  the  customs  office  receives 
the  document,  it gives  the document  to the  operator  to 
enable  him  to  apply  for  payment  of  the  refund  or  sends  it 
through  administrative  channels  to the -paying  agency,  in 
which  case  the  endorsed  document  never  comes  into the  pros-
session of  the  beneficiary; 
- where  the goods  are  exported  to  a  non-member  country  without 
passing  through  the territory of  anoth~r Member  State,  the 
export  declaration  stating  that  the goods  have  Left  the 
Community  is either  : 
•  passed directly to the operator,  who  presents  it himself 
to obtain payment  of  the  refund,  or 
sent  through  administrative  channels  to the  paying  agency. 
These  procedures, necessarily  involving  the  operator  at  one 
time  or  another,  can  make  fraud  easier.  The  Committee  feels 
that  when  a  document  which  has  been  officially endorsed 
(for example,  by  the  customs)  is put  forward  by  the operator 
in  support  of  a  payment  claim  to  another  agency  (interven-
tion  agency,  for  example),  which  may  be  in  another  Member 
State, it  should  be  possible to  compare  the details given 
on  the document  simply  and  rapidly  with  the  information  at 
the disposal  of  the department  which  endorsed  the document. 
The  rules as  they  now  stand  require  the paying  body,  customs 
office or other  department  concer.ned  to  send  the  document 
to the  issuing  authority  for  verification  in  case  of  doubt. 
The  Committee  feels that  this  pro~edure allows  too great  a 
degree  of  subjectivity  and  for this  reason  is  unsound  <1>. 
Exhaustive  checking,  which  would  have  to  be  computerised, 
would  considerably  diminish  the  risk  of  wrong  Community 
payments. 
(1)  These  comments  also  apply  to  intra-Community  t~ade. - 114  -
B)  Differentiated  refunds 
In  cases  where  the  rate of  refund  varies  according  to desti-
nation  or  intended  use  of  the product  exported,  Article  11 
of  Regulation  n°  192/75  stipulates that  evidenc~ must  be 
provided  that  the  products  have  been  c~eared through  customs 
for  release  for  home  use  in  the  non-member  courtry  concerned. 
Proof  of this  is provided  by  the transport  document  and  the 
customs  document  or, failing  that,  by  certain  documents 
accepted  in  Lieu.  The  refund  claim  must  be  lodged  within 
six  months. 
Some  non-member  countries  do  not  issue  customs  papers  which 
mention  specifically that  the  goods  have  been  cleared  for 
home  use.  Exporters  then  have  to  use  documents  accepted  in 
lieu  in  particular certificates  issued  by  supervisory  compa-
nies.  These  companies  must,  under  Commission  Regulation 
(EEC>  n°  192/75,  be  approved  by  the  Member  State  in  which 
the  goods  were  cleared  through  customs  for  export.  However, 
there  is no  Community  list  for  operators giving  all the 
firms  approved  by  all Member  States.  The  Regulations  covering 
documents  accepted  in  lieu to furnish  proof  of  clearance 
through  customs  have  been  altered  several  times  to  take 
account  of  the difficulties with  which  the  Member  States  were 
confronted 
- the  list of  documents  which  can  be  accepted  as  proof  of 
unloading  of  the product  of  the  non-member  country  of  desti-
nation  has  been  extended; 
- the  competent  authorities of  the Member  States  have  been 
given  wider  aut.ority to exempt  operators  from  producing 
the proof  normally  required,  with  the  exception  of  the 
transport  document. 
An  ad  hoc  expert  group  is also working  on  all the problems 
concerned  with  trade  and  particularly the problem  of  proof 
of  arrival  at  destination. - 115  -
The  Committee  feels that  this proliferation of  forms  of 
proof  makes  control difficult  • 
• 
C.  IMPROPER  EXPORT  OPERATIONS 
Council  Regulation  n°  166/64  on  the  system  applicable  to 
certain  classes  of  compound  animal  feedingstuffs  provided 
for  Levies  and  refunds  for  goods  containing  products  subject 
to the  common  organization  of  the  market  in  cereals.  Among 
these products  was  manioc  meal. 
During  the  1964/65  marketing  year  an  exporter  exported  a 
mixture  to  non-member  countries  98X  of  which  was  made  up  of 
products not  subject  to  the  organization of  the  market  and 
2X  of  which  was  manioc  meal.  At  this destination  the  mixture 
was  broken  down  and  its main  components,  with  the  exception 
of  the  manioc  meal, ·were  reimported  into the  Community. 
The  firm  maintained  that  the full  refund  should  be  paid  if 
a  compound  feedingstuff  contains one  component  which  is  sub-
ject  to  Community  rules,  no  matter  what  the  quantity  of  this 
is. 
The  Court  of  Justice of  the  European  Communities  did  not 
accept  this  argument  (1).  It  inferred  from  the  recitals of 
Council  Regulation  n°  166/64  that  the purpose  of  the  export 
refund  is to  compensate  for  the  effect  on  the  price of  com-
pound  feedingstuffs  of  the  rules applicable to the  components. 
It  follows  that  the  refund  should  be  in  proportion  to the 
quantity  in  the  mixture  of  the  raw  materials  subject  to  the 
organization of  the  market. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  Council  and  the  Commission  may 
not  use  approximate  and  flat-rate  methods  of  calculation, 
but  the  rules  must  "in no  case  be  extended  to  cover  abusive 
practices of  an  exporter"  (paragraph  n°  21  in  the  Court's 
judgment). 
(1)  Case  125/76,  judgment  given  on  11  October  1977. 
Reports  of  Cases  before  the  Court  1977,  p.  1593. • 
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Since  this time  the Community  has  forged  more  sophisticated 
tools to  combat  abuse  of  the  rules.  The  flat  rates,  however, 
must  be  used  with  caution.  They  may  still provide  exporters 
with  unjustifiable profits in  certain  cases. 
SECTION  III - IRREGULARITIES  (See  Annex  II to this  report) 
A)  False descriptions  (see  case  13  in  Annex  II) 
There  have  been  cases  where  the  contents  of  cereal products, 
which  govern  the granting  of  the  refund,  have  been  falsely 
described. 
Certain products,  such  as  maize  starch, do  not  rank  as  cereal 
products  in  the  refunds  nomenclature. 
There  has  been  a  case  of  an  exporter  obtaining  a  refund  for 
a  product  which  contained  maize  starch  by  indicating  instead 
a  similar quality of  cereal  meal,  which  is  indeed  classed  as 
a  cereal  product. 
Only  a  subsequent  check  carried out  on  the  firm's  premises 
in  connection  with  the  verification of  other export  trans-
actions  brought  the  irregularity to  light. 
The  physical  controls  made  during  customs  clearance  are  still 
hampered  by  similar difficulties, since products  eligible for 
refunds  often  closely  resemble  products  that  are not,  and 
the difference  can  be  defected only  by  chemical  analysis. 
B)  Plant  which  interferes with  control  Csee  case  8) 
Cunning  contrivances  can  sometimes  invalidate the procedure 
of  taking  samples. - 117  -
One  merchant  had  incorporated  into  the  silo automatic 
sampling  machines  fed  with  first-category  barley eligible 
for  a  refund,  while  the  silo itself  contained  barley that 
was  not  eligible for  refund.  Thus  an  analysis  of  the 
sample  taken  at  the  factory  showed  that  the  barley  was  first 
category  while  the  analysis  made  on  customs  clearance proved 
that  the  barley  was  not  eligible for  a  refund. 
As  refunds  are  granted only  for  products  which  are  actually 
exported  and  which  qualify  for  refunds  on  account  of  their 
type  and  characteristics, it is essential  that  the goods 
analysed  are  the  same  as  those  exported.  This  would  be  the 
case  if the  samples  from  the  lot  in  question  were  taken  by 
the  appropriate  customs  department  at  the  time  of  export 
clearance.  It  is  much  more  difficult to establish  whether 
samples  taken  at  any  time  within  the  undertaking  following 
a  production  check  actually  come  from  the  lot  intended  for 
export. 
C)  Deflection of  trade  <see  case  5) 
A consignment  of  flour  was  cleared  through  customs  in Member 
State A for  export  to a  non-member  country.  After  the goods 
were  loaded,  the  consignor  found  out  that  the purchaser's  re-
presentative  had  had  a  bill of  Lading  drawn  up  giving  Member 
State B as destination.  The  object  of  the operation  was  to 
obtain  a  refund  for  non-member  countries  and  to  re-sell  the 
goods  at  Community  prices. 
The  consignor  made  a  complaint  and  informed  the  customs  of 
Member  State  A,  who  in  turn  notified their  colleagues  in 
Member  State  B.  As  a  result  of  this, the perpetrators of 
the  fraud  rerouted  the  vessel  to a  non-member  country  other 
than  the originally  intended. - 118  -
This  irregularity  highlighted the  importance  of  cooperation 
between  judicial  and  customs  authorities  and  between  the 
customs  authorities of  two  Member  States under  mutual  admi-
nistrative assistance  arrangements. 
SECTION  IV  - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A>  Difficulties  in  implementation 
1.  Controlling documents  which  do  not  circulate through 
administrative  channels 
The  Committee  finds  that  documents  which  represent  payment 
orders  by  the  Community  are  handed  to the payer  for 
cashing.  It  feels  that  this procedure  involves  substantial 
risk  for  Community  funds. 
As  the  strictest  safeguards  should  be  provided  in  respect 
of  payments,  the exporter  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be 
excluded  from  the  refund  payment  system.  If this  is found 
impossible  to  implement,  systematic  controls  ~hould be 
carried out  and  this  should  be  done  rapidly  so  that  all 
risk  of  fraud  is eliminated.  A system  of  this kind  can 
only  be  established by  using  a  computer  network  covering 
the  various  departments  of  all the Member  States.  Data 
processing  systems  have  been  developed  in  most  Member 
States but  they  are often not  compatible  with  one  another. 
For  this  reason  the  Council  decided  to  carry  out  a  study 
of  the data processing  systems  CCADDIA  system,  see  Annex  IV 
to this  report>. 
2.  Checking  destination  in  the  case  of  differentiated refunds 
The  Committee  is aware  of  the difficulties encountered  by 
exporters  in  obtaining  the necessary documents  to prove - 119  -
release  for  home  use  of  foods  in  a  non-member  country. 
It nevertheless  stresses that  the documents  required  entail 
an  undertaking  by  the  Community  to pay  and  that  it is 
accordingly desirable  for  the  Community  authorities to 
have  statements  by  the  official departments  of  non-member 
countries to the effect  that  the operations  are  in  order. 
In  cases  where  such  evidence  is not  av'ailable,  the  Committee 
recommends  that  the greatest  care  be  taken  in assessing 
the  minimum  requirements  for  proof  equivalent  to  the  cus-
toms  document.  It  recommends,  in  particular, that  a  list 
should  be  drawn  up  of  all  the  control  and  supervisory 
firms  approved  by  the  Member  States. 
3.  Improper  export  operations 
The  Committee  has  found  that  the  flat-rate  approach  to 
calculating  refunds  for  compound  feeding  stuffs  can  lead 
to  improper  operations  by  exporters.  The  Member  States 
may  encounter  difficulties in  running  a  system  based  on 
the actual  composition  of  the products.  The  line of  ar~ 
gument  adopted  by  the  Court  of  Justice  in  Case  125/76 
referred to  above  indicates that,  ~here the  conditions 
laid  down  in  the  text  of  the  Regulations  are  met,  account 
should  be  taken  of  whether  the operation  for  which  the 
payment  is  requested  will  allow  the  achievement  of  the 
economic  aim  for  which  the  subsidy  was  granted.  The 
criterion "improper  operations"  thus provides  a  yardstick 
whereby  the  Community's  financial  interests  can  be  defended 
effectively. - 120  -
8)  Combating  irregularities 
1.  Applitation  of  control  methods 
Cross-checking  enables  irregularities to be  detected more 
successfully than  does  a  single  control  system.  It  is 
aware  that  the  Member  States'  authorities  ~o not  have 
the.staff or  funds  to  carry out  repeated  verifications. 
It feels that  control  carried out  at  the time  of  export 
is still of  value  but  recommends  stepping  up  manufacturing 
controls withing  the  meaning  of  the  Directive of  27  June 
1977  on  controls on  operations  financed  from  the  Guarantee 
Section  of  the  EAGGF  (1). 
In  this  respect, Article 9  of  the  Directive  states that 
"The  Member  States  and  the  Commission  shall  regularly  re-
view  the  application of  this  Directive".  An  exchange  of 
views  of  this kind  could,  include  the establishment  of  a 
single  list of  "sensitive products"  so  that  investigation 
could  be  directed  more  towards  the  fiels  in  which  the 
financial  risk  for  the  Community  is greatest. 
2.  Cooperation  between  customs  departments  and  the  investiga-
tion departments  in the  Member  States 
The  Committee  emphasizes  the  value  of  mutual  customs 
assistance  in  detecting  irregularities and  providing  evi-
dence  of  irregular activities on  the part  of  operators. 
The  Committee  recommends  that  cooperation  between  the de-
partments  of  the  various Member  States  should  be  stepped 
up. 
(1)  Council  Directive n°  77/435,  OJ  N°  L 172,  12.7.1977, p.  17. - 121  -
CHAPTER  IX 
DIFFICULTIES  PECULIAR  TO  PROCESSED  PRODUCTS 
This  chapter  is  devoted  to products  of  first-stage 
processing,  such  as  flour,  which  come  under  the  common  organ-
izat1on  of  the  cereals  market,  and  to  products  not  listed in 
Annex  II  which  also  constitute processed  agricultural  sub-
stances  but  which  are  not  covered  by  common  organizations. and  in 
respect  of  which  it  was  necessary  to devise  a  system  maintain-
ing  equality of  competition between operators  working  outside 
the  Community  and  operators  working  inside  the  Community. 
Expenditure  relating  to  export  refunds  on  products of 
first-stage  processing  is  included  in  that  for  basic  cereal 
products  (see  Chapter  VIII).  Thus,  only  estimates  of  costs are 
available.  Expenditure  for  1979  is  expected  to  total  375  mil-
lion  EUA. 
Expenditure  in  respect  of  export  refunds  on  products 
not  listed  in  Annex  II  is as  follows  (1) 
1973 
1974 
1975 
23.9  MEUA 
13.7  MEUA 
23.9  MEUA 
1976 
1977 
1978 
67.0  MEUA 
136.3  MEUA 
208.5  MEUA 
(1)  The  amounts  have  been  converted  into  EUA  in order  to 
facilitate  comparison. - 122  -
The  refunds  cover  basic products other  than  cereals 
contained  in  non-Annex  II products,  such  as  milk  and  sugar. 
In  1974  expenditure on  refunds  paid  in  respect  of 
incorporated  cereals  was  about  1 million  EUA,  a~d in 1977 
and  1978  about  50  million  EUA  and  52  million  EUA  respect-
ively. 
The  import  levies do  not  yield as  much  as  the 
refunds  cost,  since the  Community  is a  net  exporter  of  pro-
cessed products. 
SECTION  I  - RULES 
A.  Import  charges 
1.  Products  of first-stage processing 
The  levy  consists  of  two  components 
- a  fixed  component,  charged  ad  valorem  at  a  level 
meeting  the  need  to protect  the processing 
industry  in the  community  ; 
- a  variable  component,  determined partly by  the 
average  levy  (calculated on  the  basis of  the first 
25  days  of  the  month  preceding  the  month  for  which 
the  levy  is to  be  fixed)  on  the  basic products 
making  up  the processed product  and  partly by  the 
application of  the  standard  coefficient  reflecting 
the  composition  of  the processed product. 
2.  Products  not  Listed  in Annex  II 
The  charge  provided  for  in the  common  customs  tariff 
consists  of  : - 123  -
- and  ad  valorem  duty,  which  constitutes the  fixed 
component  of  this  charge, 
- a  variable  component  intended to account  for  the dif-
ference  between  prices  in the  Community  and  import 
prices.  For  each  product,  the  variable  component  is 
fixed  by  the  Commission  for  quarterly periods  begin-
ning  on  1  February,  1 May,  1 August  and  1  November. 
The  variable  component  is  calculated,on the  basis of 
the  difference, determined  in  respect  of  the quantity 
of  each  of  the  basic products to be  taken  into  consider-
at ion,  between  : 
•  the  average  of  the  threshold prices  fixed  for  each 
of  the  three  months  of  the quarter  in  respect  of 
which  the  variable  component  is fixed,  and 
•  the  average  of  the  cif prices or  the  free-at-fron-
tier prices  (as  the  case  may  be)  referred to for 
the purpose  of  fixing  the  levies  applicable to each 
of  the  relevant  basic products,  calculated over  a 
period  comprising  the  first ten days  of  the  month 
preceding  the  quarter  in  respect  of  which  the  vari-
able  component  is fixed  and  the  two  months  immedi-
atelx precedi~g this  month. 
B.  Export  refunds 
1.  Refunds  on  products  of  first-stage processing 
(obtained generally from  one  basic  product) 
The  refund  is based  normally  on  the  average  of  the  levies 
of  the  first  25  days  ofthepreceding·monthmulti-
plied by  a  coefficient  which  reflects the quantity of 
the processed product.  However,  the  refund  calculated  in - 124  -
this  way  can  be  adjusted  in  relation with  other  criteria. 
Special  cases  :  flour  and  malt 
The  refund  for  flour  is determined directly according  to 
the  world  price for this product  and  not  according  to 
the  average  levy  on  common  wheat  multiplied by  a  standard 
coefficient. 
In  the  case  of  malt,  a  standard  coefficient  is used  but 
the  basis of  calculation is not  the  average  of  the  barley 
Levies  for  the first  25  days  of  the preceding  months, 
but  a  weekly  average  of  the  levies  less  the  difference 
between  the  threshold price and  an  average  market  price 
within the  Community. 
2.  Refunds  on  products  not  listed in Annex  II 
A refund  rate is fixed  for  each  month  per  100  kg  of  basic 
product  taking  into account  the  conditions  as  regards 
supplies of  these products  and  the  need  to e·nsure  egual 
conditions of  competition  in  relation to the  inward  pro-
cessing  system.  The  quantity of  each  of  the  basic prod-
·ucts  to be  referred to for  the  calculation of  the amount 
of  the  refund  is determined  according  to the quantity 
actually used  in the processed product. 
However,  for  certain products  (e.g.  pasta)  the quantity 
of  the  basic  product  is determined  on  a  standard basis. 
SECTION  II  - CONTROL  SYSTEM 
Article 8 of  Council  Regulation  N°  2682/72,  relating - 125  -
to  products  not  Listed  in  Annex  II,  provides  for  the  organiz-
ationofcontrols  in  the  Member  States  and  requires  the  Latter 
and  the  Commission  to  keep  each  other  informed on  a  reciprocal 
basis.  However,  this  procedure  does  not  enable  the  Commission 
staff and  the  Member  States to obtain  information on  the  con-
trol  arrangements  in  an  entirely satisfactory manner.  Each  state 
has  tended  to  use  the  control  facilities  it  already  possessed, 
some  relying  more  on  chemical  analysis,  others  more  on  control 
of  production.  And  the  frquency  of  controls ,is  by  no  means  the 
same  in  each  State.  It  should  be  pointed out  that  Article 8 
applies  only  to  export  refunds- import  controls or  controls 
relating  to  the  application of the  MCAs  are  not  covered  by  spe-
cific  Legislation.  This  is  also  true  for  productsof  first-stage 
processing,  for  which  there  is also  no  special  Legislation  con-
cerning  controls. 
The  Committee  is  concerned  here  only  with  physical  con-
trols of  processed products.  The  administrative difficulties  com-
mon  to all  products  were  examined  in  Chapters  VII  and  VIII  on 
trade  in  general. 
A.  Difficulties of  interpretation of the  customs  classification 
Because  of  the  complex  composition of  some  products,  tariff 
classifications  may  vary  from  one  Member  State to  another. 
The  amounts  charged or granted on  very  similar products  may 
be  very  different  according  to  the  heading  under  which  they 
are  classified.  For  instance  crispbreads  (biscottes)  are 
classified under  the  heading  "fine bakers'  wares"  in one 
Member  State and  "ordinary bakers'  wares"  in  two  others. - 126  -
This  makes  them  eligible for  different  MCA  rates  with 
significant  consequences  on  trade  in these products  between 
Member  States. 
This  difference  is  based on  the  interpretation of  the  Legis-
lation applied strictly in one  Member  State while  in others 
various  ingredients  added  in  small  proportions  (about  SX) 
are  not  included.  This  difference  is further  strengthened 
by  differences  in  control  facilities  available to  Member 
States.  In  respect  of  imports,  all  the authorities  can  do 
is  carry out  a  chemical  analysis  a  posteriori,  white  in the 
Member  States of origin the  customs  services  can  of  course 
inspect  the manufacturer's  premises  and  verify  the quan-· 
tities.of products  actually  used. 
B.  Different  results of  the  chemical  analysis 
Moreover,  the  chemical  analysis  carried out  in the  various 
Member  States  can  give results  which  sometimes  differ  enough 
to  warrant  differing  classification of the  same  product, 
thus  entailing differing  payments  or  charges. 
c.  Difficulties  in determining  the origin of  some  ingredients 
The  composition of  a  processed product  can  very  often be 
determined  by  chemical  analysis,  but  it  is more  difficult 
to  determine  the origin of the  ingredients  yet  the  rate of 
the  refund  or  the  MCA  applicable to  an  ingredient  may  vary 
according  to origin. 
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starch  products  or  sugar.  The  raw  material  - sucrose or  starch-
may  be  identified  by  scientific methods  which  detect  the  quan-
tity of  residue of  certain sugars.  But  in practice,  however, 
for  technical  and  commercial  reasons,  sorbitols  based on  su-
crose  and  sorbitols based on  starch  are  mixed.  There  are  no 
analytical  methods  whereby  the  respective proportions of  two 
products  in  such  mixtures  can  be  ascertained., Operators  using 
both  maize  and  sugar  in  their  factories  have  a  strong  incen-
tive  to  make  out  false declarations  in order  to obtain  t~·e 
highest  refund. 
Likewise  the  starch  contained  in  many  processed products  may  be 
cereal  starch or  manioc  starch.  The  origin of  the  starch  can  be 
determined  when  it  has  not  undergone  hydrothermal  treatment, 
but  chemical  analysis  can  no  longer  do  this after  such  treatment. 
D.  Practical  difficulties of  control 
The  example  given  in the  preceding  paragraph  concerne  cases 
where  analysis  carried out  at  the  time  of  exportation does  not 
enable  the  basic  products  incorporated  into  the  processed pro-
duct  to  be  determined.  Much  more  frequent  are  the  cases  where 
the analysis  clearly  determines  the basic  products  used  and 
the quantities  present  in  the  processed quantities  but  not 
the quantities  employed  during  the  manufacturing  procedure, 
which  alone  must  serve  as  the basis  for  calculation of the 
refunds.  In order  to  be  effective,  control  must  be  carried 
out  at  the  places  of  manufacture  and  must  cover  production 
tehcniques,  the  stores  acccounts  and  the  trading  accounts. 
The  Committee  found  that  checks  of  this  type,  which  call  for 
a  Large,  properly  trained staff,  were  not  frequent  enough 
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SECTION  III - DETERMINATION  OF  MONETARY  COMPENSATORY  AMOUNTS 
A.  The  MCAs  on  processed products 
The  MCAs  applicable  to  processed products  are  calculated as 
a  rule  in  the  same  way  as  the  variable  component  of the  im-
port  levy,  on  the basis  of  a  standard  composition of the pro-
cessed product.  Where  several  processed products  can  be ob-
tained at  the  same  time  from  a  single basic product,  the  levy 
applicable  to  the  main  processed product  i~ generally  calcul-
ated  in  such  a  way  as  to  reflect  the entire  levy  applicable 
to the basic  product.  The  other  sub-products  are  subject  to 
separate  levies.  It  follows  that  the  total  of  the  levies ap-
plicable to  the  main  processed product  and  the  subproducts  is 
higher  than  the  levy  applicable  to  the basic product  which  was 
used  to make  them. 
Applied  to  MCAs,  which  are either  levied or  granted, this 
method  of  calculation  can  in certain cases  give  rise to  unequal 
competition between  undertakings  in the  various  Member  States 
or  even  generate artificial trade  flows. 
It  is true  that  the effects of  the method  of  calculating the 
MCAs  on  trade  are difficult to  assess  because other  factors 
come  into play.  It  is  also difficult to  work  out  how  trade 
would  have  developed  without  them. 
The  fact  remains  that,  for  certain processed products,  the 
financial  neutrality  which  should enable  the  impact  of the 
M~s applied to  ~he basic  products  to  be  offset exactly  is 
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8.  Calculation  examples 
The  Committee  has  chosen  to  illustrate these  i~equalities 
by  two  examples- pasta  products  (products  not  listed in 
Annex  II)  and  derived  maize  products - in  respect  of  which 
the effects differ  in  Member  States  with  depreciated  cur-
rencies  and  Member  States  with  appreciated  ~urrencies. 
1.  Pasta  products 
If  imports  of durum  wheat  attract  an  MCA  of  100,  the  MCAs 
on  reexported processed products are  113.3,  of  which  93.2 
is  for  pasta  alone.  In  other  words,  the"operator  in  an 
appreciated  currency  country  must  may  a  Levy  of  100  on 
entry but  can  claim  113.3  on  export,  of  which  93.2  if he 
decides  to  export  pasta products  only. 
An  operator  in  a  depreciated  currency  country  must  pay 
113.3 on  exportation of  which  93.2  for  pasta  products, 
while  he  received only  100  on  importation. 
In  trade  between  Member  States  with  currencies  which  have 
appreciated or  depreciated  in  relation to  the  green  rates, 
the  advantage  of  one  operator  and  the disadvantage of another 
are  combined  - for  the  durum  wheat  the  two  effec~ represent 
26.6/.  of  the  MCA. 
2.  Derived  maize  products 
The  Committee  learned of  the  following  case  (1)  : 
a  firm  in  a  depreciated-currency  Member  State exported hull-
ed  maize  (tariff  heading  11.02  B II  c)  to  a  neighbouring 
appreciated-currency  Member  State  for  processing  in  its 
<1>  See  Case  N°  16  in  Annexe  II  to  this  r~port. - 130  -
subsidiary.  All  the  processed  product~ were  re-exported 
to  the original  Member  State.  The  charging  and  the  grant-
ing  of  the  MCA  Left  a  positive balance of  60X.  This  oper~ 
at1on involved a  quantity of  10.000  tonnes  during  the 1977/ 
78  marketing  year. 
The  parent  firm  stated that  it was  obliged to process  its 
maize  in its subsidiary  in the neighbouring  ~ember State 
in order  to be  able  to  withstand  competition  from  meal  manu-
facturers  in that  Member  State. 
Since  that  time  the operation  has  become  a  little less 
profitable as  the  adjustment  of the  MCA's  (1)  has  brought 
the  margin  down  to  44X. 
SECTION  IV  - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Difficulties of  control 
Difficulties arise mainly  from  the difirences  in the  results 
of the analysis or  the  impossibility of  determining  the actual 
composition of  a  product.  There  is thus  a  danger  that  operators 
handling  the  relevant  products  will fill out  false  declarations 
in order to  maximize  the  refund or obtain the most  fa~ourable 
MCA. 
These  disadvantages  would  be  partly eliminated if the manufac-
ture of  these products  was  supervised.  The  Committee  thus  .rec-
ommends  that  a  List  of "sensitive products"  should  be  drawn 
up  and  that  on-the-spot  coritrols 
(2)  Commission  Regulation  EEC  N°  1994/78  - OJ  N°  L 230,  22.8.1978 
for  products  not  Listed  in  Annex  II. 
Commission  Regulation  EEC  N°  746/79,  OJ  N°  L 95,  16.4.1979 
for  starch products. - 131  -
of  the  stores  accounts  of  these  proaucts  and  the  general 
accounts  should  be  intensified  in  the  spirit of the  Direc-
tive of  27  June  1977  relating  to  the  control  of operations 
financed  by  the  FEOGA  Guarantee  Section  (1). 
It  is  also desirable  that  the  results of  this  control  should 
serve  as  a  reference  in  the event  of disputes  between  the 
customs  of  the  various  Member  States.  The  Committee  recommends 
here  that  an  efficient  Communi~procedure should  be  introduced 
to  prevent  the differing tariff classification of  products 
subject  to  intra-Community  trade. 
B.  MCA  rates 
The  use  of  standard  rates  for  the  calculation of  the  MCAs  of 
processed products  gives  rise to  not  inconsiderable differ-
ences of treatment in  some  cases  between  traders  in different 
Member  States.  It  is  aware  of  the difficulties encountered 
by  Commission  staff  in  efforts  to  remedy  the  disadvantages 
arising  when  MCAs  are  paid or  charged  on  the basis of  stan-
dard proportions.  Consequently,  it  recommends  that  the  MCA 
rates  for  processed  products  should be  re-examined  case  by 
case  in  order  to eliminate  the  most  obvious  inequalities. 
(1)  Council  Directive  7//435  - OJ  L  172,  12.7.1977,  p.  17. - 132  -
CONCLUSIONS  AND  FINAL  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In  the  introduction to this  report  the  Committee  re-
ferred to the  conclusions  and  recommendations  contained  in  its 
earlier  reports  on  milk  products,  oil  seeds  and'olive oil, beef 
and  veal,  and  wine. 
In  the  subsequent  chapters  the  Committee  has  accompa-
nied  its analyses of  the  various  problems  by  appropriate  recom-
mendations  to the  Commission. 
To  conclude  its report,  the  main  general  conclusions 
reached  by  the  Committee  as  a  result  of  its investigation of 
the  cereals  sector  have  been  grouped  under  two  principal  head-
ings  : 
- a  summary  of  the economic  situation 
- recommendations  for  the  improvement  of  Community  rules. 
SECTION  I  - SUMMARY  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 
The  cereal  sector has  been  moving  towards  an  over-
all  surplus  situation  :  the  consumption  of  fodder  grains  has 
lost  ground  to the  consumption  of  substitutes, most  of  which 
are  imported,  especially manioc.  At  the  same  time,  production 
has  been  steadily  increasing because  of  better yields due  to 
technical  progress  and  the  replacement  of  spring  cereals  by 
more  productive  winter  cereals. - 133  -
This  trend  is  particularly disturbing  because  the  maize 
shortage  is still severe  while  wheat  and  barley  surpluses  con-
tinue to mount.  The  new  price  system  set  up  in  1976  (silo system) 
was  intended  to  bring  about  the  replacement  of the  scarcer  ce-
reals used  for  feeding  animals- i.e. maize- by  cereals  in 
surplus  supply. 
The  scheme  has  been  only  partly  successful  because  of 
the  growing  use  of  substitute products,  usually preferred to 
cereals  of  which  there  were  already  surpluses  while  maize 
consumption  has  failed to contract.  The  substitute products 
are  attractive  to  farmers  because,  in  terms  of  nutritional 
value,  they  are  cheaper  than  maize,  barley  and  common  wheat. 
A corollary of this economic  disequilibrium is an 
ever-heavier  financial  burden  for  FEOGA.  Exports  of  increas-
ing  surpluses of  common  wheat  and  barley  involve  expendi-
ture  in  the  form  of  refunds,  the  volume  of  which  has  tripled 
in three  years  and  in  1979  accounts  for  1.209,4 million  EUA 
of  budget  appropriations,  or  nearly  77  ~ of expenditure  in 
the  cereals  sector  and  11,  6  ~  of  total  FEOGA  guarantee  ex-
penditure. - 134  -
SECTION  II - RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  THE  IMPROVEMENT  OF  COMMUNITY 
RULES 
In  formulating  its recommendations  on  completing  this 
inquiry,  the  Committee  has  concentrated mainly  on  points  con-
nected  with  requirements  in the  present  rules,  but  has  also 
considered  how  the  Member  States apply  the  rules and  ensure 
that  they  have  been  properly  complied  with. 
A)  Improvement  of  the  rules 
1.  Reconsideration of certain  intervention measures 
The  Commission  recommends  that  certain measures  be  re-
considered  in  respect  of  their economic  implications, 
their  cost  and  the major  difficulties they  involve 
with  regard  to controls. 
In  this connection,  the  Committee  has  noted  that  some 
Member  States  are  holding  very  large  intervention 
.  . 
stocks  while  others  could  offer outlets  for  them. 
Such  surpluses are  maintained  at  considerable cost  to 
FEOGA. 
In  some  marketing  years  aid  for  private  storage  is  .  . 
paid virtually without  stipulations  as  to the duration 
of  storage;  this  is  liable to nullify the potential 
economic  advantages  of  such  operations,  the principle 
of  which  is to withdraw  from  the  market  certain quan-
tities of  cereals under  contract  for  specific periods 
in order to  relieve the market. - 135  -
Transfers  between  intervention agencies  should  be  con-
fined  to exceptional  circumstances  because  the  Committee 
takes  the  view  that  the  common  organization must  ensure 
normal  operation of  the  market. 
The  Committee  is  aware  of the  social  and  economic  case 
for  maintaining  durum  wheat  production  in. some  areas of 
the  Community  but  feels  that  the  aid  scheme  should per-
haps  be  confined to  regions  where  natural  conditions 
make  for  low  yields  and  it is difficult  or  impossible 
for  farmers  to grow  other  crops. 
2.  Improvement  of  the  rules 
The  Committee  feels  that  the  rules  should  be  simplified 
wherever  possible,  that  certain ambiguities  should  be 
removed  and  that  certain distortions  should  be  correc-
ted to  avoid  giving  unwarranted  financial  benefit. 
a)  Simplification of  the  rules 
- Codification of  the  rules  on  the use  of  the  TS 
transit  document. 
Document  T5  represents  an  undertaking  on  the part 
of  the  authorities that  payment  will  be  made  as  soon 
as  the  operations  described  on  the document  are 
certified as  having  been  checked.  Since  the  docu- , 
ment  is  used  for  the  control  of  some  35  different 
operations,  the  Committee  recommends  codifying 
the  rules.  If that  proves  too difficult  in practice 136  -
then  a  compendium  of  the  regulations  involving  the 
use  of  the  TS  can  be  drawn  up. 
- Grouping  of tariff headings 
The  Committee  recommends  grouping  together tariff 
headings  for  processed products  the  composition  of 
which  is similar, to  avoid  the difficulties  inherent 
in  controls  and  financial  risks  for  FEOGA. 
- Discontinuation of  technical distinctions  which  are 
difficult to  check 
Efforts  should  be  made  to  avoid  introducing  into 
the  rules distinctions  based  on  the specific pro-
perties or  presentation of  products eligible for 
compensation  if it is virtually  impossible  in prac-
tice to distinguish  them,  or  if the  rules  do  not 
spell out  precise criteria to distinguish between 
the  various  forms  or  presentations. 
The  Council  recently1 applied this principle  in 
the  case  of  carry-over  payments,  for  which  the 
implementing  procedures  no  longer  make  any 
distinction between  common  wheat  of  bread-making 
quality  and  other  common  wheat. 
1  Council  Regulation  CEEC)  No  946/79  of  8  May  1979  fixing  a 
carry-aver  payment  for  common  wheat,  rye  and  maize  remaining 
in  stock  at  the end  of  the  1978/79  marketing  year 
(OJ  L 120,  16  May  1979) - 137  -
b)  Resolution  of  vague  or  ambiguous  points 
The  Committee  has  noticed  some  major  problems  caused 
by  vagueness  in the  rules  on  specific  points  some  of 
which  actually determine  the  award  or  refusal  of  a 
payment.  As  a  result  of  vague  wordings,  the  Member 
States  have  adopted  differing  implementing  procedures 
for  a  single  set  of  rules,  this giving  rise to diffe-
rences  in  the  treatment  of  beneficiaries  in  the  various 
Member  States. 
For  instance,the procedures  for  granting  the  carry-over 
payment  for  cereals during  transit  should  be  standardized, 
particularly as  regards  the  crossing  of  frontiers  a-
round  the  date  of  eligibility. 
The  rules  for  implementing  production  refunds  should 
lay  down  quality  criteria for  the eligible basic  pro-
duct,  procedures  for  ensuring  supervision of  products 
and  the  general  control  procedures  to  be  fulfilled 
before  the  refund  is granted. 
Similarly,  something  should  be  done  to clarify and 
issue  in good  time  the  implementing  rules  concerning 
aid  to  durum  wheat.  A pasta-making test  should  be 
adopted  at  Community  level,  together  with  a  list of 
eligible varieties  region  by  region,  giving  reliable 
guidance  with  regard to quality. - 138  -
c>  Adjustment  of  the  rate of  monetary  compensatory 
amounts 
The  MCAs  charged  or  paid  on  processed products  do  not 
always  correspond  to those  charged  or  paid on  their 
basic  ingredients.  Despite  improvements  effected, 
the  fact  that  some  MCAs  are  not  neutral  is a  handicap 
for  the  firms  of  certain  Member  States and  leads  to 
distortions of  competition  between  Community  firms. 
The  most  noteworthy  cases  include that  of  products 
derived  from  maize  and  that  of  pasta products. 
The  Committee  recommends  that  special  study  be  given to 
determine  economic  implications  of  measures  at  pre-
sent  in  force  and  that  the  faults  seen  to be  present 
should  be  corrected. 
B)  Improvement  of  implementation  of  the  rules  and  controls by 
the Member  States 
There  have  been  persistent  inadequacies  in the  implement-
ation of  the  rules  by  the  Member  States and  considerable 
divergencies  in the  prevention of  infringements. 
1.  Use  of  the  TS  control  copy 
There  is evidence  of  inadequate  use  of transit docu-
ments  or  wrong  entries on  these  documents.  The  Commit-
tee  wishes  to  renew  the  recommendation  made  in previous - 139  -
reports  that  the training of  officials using  customs  docu-
ments  should  be  stepped  up.  Some  efforts have  already been 
made  in this direction through  the organization of  training 
seminars  for  national  inspectors.  The  Committee  hopes  that 
the  Commission  will  continue  work  along  these  lines. 
On  a  more  fundamental  point,  the  Committee  notes  that  once 
the  TS  documents  have  received  the  certificates necessary 
for  the granting  of  a  refund  or  compensatory  amounts,  they 
are  sometimes  transmitted outside  administrative  channels 
during  part  of the procedure,  which  varies  between  Member 
States.  The  Committee  feels  that  the beneficiary should 
not  in  many  circumstances  be  involved  in the  returning 
of  the  TS,  because  of  the  grave  risk  of  fraud.  In  any 
case  it  recommends  that  a  document  issued by  an  official 
department  (customs,  for  example>,  presented by  the  ope-
rator to  another  agency  (intervention office, for  example> 
as  evidence  for  the  obtaining of  the  payment  should  be 
checkable  easily and  without  delay  by  the  paying  agency 
against  the  information  held  by  the  department  which  had 
issued the  document. - 140  -
2.  Coordination  between  the  customs  authorities of the 
Member  States 
a>  Tariff  headings 
Some  divergencies  have  been  noted  in connection  with 
the  tariff classification of particular products. 
These  divergencies  are  principally due  to differing 
systems  of  control  and  to slight  changes  in the  consti-
tuents of  a  product,  which  are  sometimes  sufficient 
to make  a  substantial difference to the  rate of  refund 
or  the  compensatory  amounts  applicable.  The  Commit-
tee  recommends  .improving  exchanges  of  i·nformation 
and  cooperation between  the  Member  States themselves 
and  between  the  States and  the  Commission,  in order 
to deal  as  rapidly as  possible  with  problems  arising 
in  connection  with  trade. 
b)  Customs  procedures 
The  Member  States differing customs  procedures  en-
tail certain difficulties  in  connection  with 
transit  operations. 
The  Committee  recommends,  first  of all, that  each 
Member  State  should  be  more  fulty  informed  about 
the  customs  procedures  of  its counterparts  and  that 
measures  should  subsequently  be  taken to try  and 
harmonize  the  various  procedures. - 141  -
3.  Division of  financial  responsibility  for  stocks  lost 
or  spoiled 
The  storage  regulations  have  very  little to  say  about  the 
financial  responsibility for  stocks  lost  or  spoiled;  this 
gives  rise to certain disputes  betwee~ the  Member  States 
and  the  Commission. 
The  Commission  is preparing  new  provisions  on  storage 
and  recommends  that  these  specifically cover  cases  liable 
to  lead  to dispute  as  a  result  of  quantity  losses  or 
depreciation of  quality. 
4.  More  intensive  controls 
In  the  preceding  chapters  the  Committee  has  stressed 
that,  in  view  of  the opportunities for  fraud, parti-
cularly stringent  controls should  be  kept  over  the 
following  operations  : 
- granting  of  aid  for  common  wheat  (controls on 
areas  sown  and  on  varieties  should  be  generalised 
and  intensified); 
- granting of  production  refunds  (the  Committee  has 
noted  inadequacies  in  certain Member  States>; 
- granting of  export  refunds  on  processed  products 
(controls of  production  should  be  more  systematic>. - 142  -
5.  Sanctions 
Some  Member  States  have  brought  out  general  legisla-
tion dealing  with  infringements  of  Community  rules, 
either  under  criminal  law  or  by  administrative action, 
whereas  others prefer to publish  specific texts,  with 
the  result that  there  are  no  sanctions  at  all for  some 
infringements  of  Community  rules  in these  countries. 
Furthermore,  some  infringements  cannot  easily be  dealt 
with  under  national  criminal  law  because  proof  of  frau-
dulent  intent  i~ often difficult to establish.  This 
ts  why  it is useful  to  have  a  system  of  administrative 
sanctions  which  can  be  applied to unlawful  action ir-
respective of  any  fraudulent  intent. 
The  Committee  recommends  that  the  defi·ciencies still 
existing  in  certain  Member  States  as  regards  penal  or 
administrative  sanctions  against  infringements  of 
Community  regulations  be  remedied  as  soon  as  possible. 
In  recommending  that  priority be  given  to  remedying 
those  deficiences  in the  legal  systems  of  Member  States, 
the  Committee  anticipates early examination  and 
discussion by  the  Council  of  Commission  proposals 
relating to protection of  Community  interests by  means 
of  penal  sanctions,  proposals  on  which  the  European 
Parliament  has  already  given  an  opinion. - 143  -
6.Electronic  data  processing 
Electronic  data  processing  can  play  an  important  role 
in the  management  and  control  of  agricultural opera-
tions.  Computers  greatly facilitate  administrative 
tasks  (filing,  automatic  handling  of  payments  and 
receipts  etc>, but  the  Committee  wishes  particularly 
to stress the  importance  of  using  computers  to faci-
litate controls  and  the detection of  irregularities. 
Such  applichtions  have  already  been  instituted in 
several  Member  States, for  instance,  systematic  cross-
checking  of  payments,  with  the  successive participation 
of  various  administrative departments,  computerized 
selection of  operations  to  be  checked,  especially in 
the  case  of  aid to durum  wheat,  and  the  compilation 
of files of  operators guilty of  fraud,  instantly 
accessible to all the  departments  involved  in controls. 
However,  the  Committee  notes  that the development  of 
computer  applications  has  been  so  far  confined  within 
national  frontiers.  It  wishes  to point  out  that  agri-
cultural operations  concern  the  Community  as  a  whole 
and  that  cases of  fraud  generally  involve  more  than 
one  Member  State. 
A Community  project  is at  present  being  studied 
(CADDIA,  see  Annex  IV>  its purpose  is ~o explore 
the  scope  for developing  and  linking present  or 
future  computer  system  in the  Member  States and  the 
Commission. - 144  -
A highly  desirable development  would  be  the  systematic 
cross-checking  of  documents  going  back  and  forth  Cfor 
instance transit operations)  between  the various Member 
States and  between  the  States and  the  Commission,  and  the 
gradual  compilation  of  Community  files of  defrauders 
and  frauds  or  an  intercommunication  system  cross-linking 
national  files. 
The  Committee  recommends  that 
- the  Member  States  should  develop  their own  EDP 
applications  in such  a  way  as to facilitate inte-
gration  in the  future; 
- the  Commission  should  speed  up  work  on  CADDIA,  to 
obtain  a  clearer picture of the  scope  for  linking 
up  national  and  Community  systems. 